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FICTIONS, FAULT, AND FORGIVENESS: 
JURY NULLIFICATION IN A NEW CONTEXT 
David N. Dorfman• 
Chris K. lijima •• 
Recently, critics of the Anglo-American jury system have com-
plained that juries in criminal trials have been ignoring the law, 
in favor of defendants who claim that they lack criminal respon-
sibility because they are affiicted by the various victimization 
syndromes now popularized in the mass media. In this Article, Pro-
fessors Dorfman and Iijima counter this characterization of the 
"runaway" jury and argue that juries are not ignoring the law, but 
rather, are exercising a primary power of the jury, to nullify the 
application of the law when such application to a particular defen-
dant is unjust. The Authors trace the development of the jury 
nullification power from its beginnings in the late seventeenth 
century to the present. The Authors then counter the standard 
arguments against jury nullification. Finally, the Authors propose 
an explicit jury nullification instruction and accommodating 
adjustments to other trial procedures that would solve the defi-
ciencies of the current manner in which juries exercise their 
nullification power. 
INTRODUCTION 
Coincident with this country's political swing to the right, the 
popular call to redefine the American character has assumed 
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an increasingly retributive tone. 1 For those who seek to 
recharacterize the national psyche and return to the virtues of 
·"traditional American values"-rugged individualism, self-
sufficiency, and national machismo-much evidence for our 
dwindling moral character is found in the American jury. 
Recent newspaper articles,2 Op-Ed pieces,3 television news 
magazines,4 and pundits of every stripe have been decrying the 
modern jury, the "runaway jury," the jury that has been "giving 
away the store," the jury that has been buying"no responsibili-
ty" defenses from clever attorneys. 5 
There is indeed· something going on. Certain communities 
and contemporary juries are taking a firmer stand against 
what they perceive to be the excesses of the criminal justice 
system than did their counterparts of thirty or forty years ago. 
However, much of what is going on is hardly new-it has been 
known historically as jury nullification, the exercise of jury 
power to disregard the judge's instructions on the law. What 
does seem new is the way juries are nullifying the law. Rather 
than directly rejecting unpopular penal law, they take excep-
tion to other well-established parts of the judge's instructions, 
such as the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
punishment as solely within the province of the judge, inter-
ested witness and witness credibility,jury sympathy, bias, and 
· prejudice. Even this kind of jury independence is neither 
unprecedented nor a contemporary phenomenon; it is simply 
1. See, e.g., CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN 
CHARACTER 241 (1992) (positing that American society has "emphasized rights over 
responsibilities, refused to hold individuals accountable for their own behavior, and 
made a national industry out of the manufacture and elaboration of grievance"). 
Hidden beneath Sykes' call for a return to old-fashioned "character" lies the equally 
old-fashioned and disquieting assumption that the condition of the poor and disen-
franchised "stems less from 'the absence of opportunity than from the inability or 
reluctance to take advantage of opportunity.' "Id. at 237 (quoting Lawrence M. Mead, 
The New Politics of the New Pouerty, 103 PuB. INTEREST 3, 3 (1991)). 
2. See, e.g., Margot Slade, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at B20 (dis-
cussing examples of defenses created by attorneys to portray their clients as victims). 
3. See, e.g., Trial by Jury, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 8, 1992, at 20 (suggesting 
explanations for the Rodney King verdicts). 
4. See generally Eye to Eye (CBS television broadcast, May 26, 1994) (considering 
the Menendez brothers and Damian Williams cases in terms of social responsibility) 
(transcript on file with the Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
5. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWIT'l, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994) (describing various 
tactics by which defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent retalia-
tion); Sophfronia S. Gregory, Oprah! Oprah in the Court!, TIME, June 6, 1994, at 30 
(attributing the trend of juries to consider mitigating circumstances, once deemed 
irrelevant, in part to the public's exposure to themes of abuse on television talk 
shows). 
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more widely experienced by the public through increased media 
coverage. 
In the past, scholars andjudges have parsed the issue of jury 
nullification, considering real nullification to be the jury's 
rejection of the penal law under which the defendant is 
charged. The jury's independent view of other factors, namely 
the standard of proof, witness credibility, and sympathy, was 
not seen as an issue of nullification but rather as the inscru-
table and unpredictable result of lay fact-finding. 6 In other 
words, the jury's nullification of the judge's charge on the penal 
law was an endeavor into an issue of "law," doctrinally the 
province of the judge, while the jury's independent view of the 
standard of proof, of witness credibility, prejudice, and sym-
pathy was properly within its "fact-finding" province. 
This traditional distinction between the jury that disregards 
a penal instruction and the jury that practices more subtle 
dynamics is a direct result of the history of jury nullification 
itself. The notion that the jury might acquit defendants "in the 
teeth of both law and facts"7 has been deeply rooted in Anglo-
American law. Thematically, the foundational jury nullification 
cases have been political cases involving the prosecution of 
crimes of conscience against the government or the prevailing 
social order.8 Because of the preponderance of cases in the 
literature, the jury nullification debate has been characterized 
, by an analysis peculiar to these cases, that is, the dynamic of 
a legally guilty defendant being acquitted because of the jury's 
rejection of an unpopular law or an oppressive government or 
the jury's embrace of the position of conscience held by the 
accused. 
6. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 116, 149 
(1966); see also discussion infra Part 11.B (detailing the findings of the Kalven and 
Zeise! jury nullification study). 
7. Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135; 138 (1920). 
8. See Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 168, 191 n.85 (1972). Scheflin defines "political trials" as including 
Id. 
(1) any trial which will have political repercussions ifthe defendant is convicted; 
(2) prosecutions of technically criminal activity when the state's motive is to 
suppress political opposition; (3) prosecutions where the state has fabricated a 
case on traditional criminal grounds but [where) the primary motive ... is to 
silence a member of a political minority; and (4) trials involving political offenses 
such as treason . . . . 
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The modern jury nullification debate has centered around 
furnishing nullification instructions from the bench in "con-
science cases."9 Because of this particular focus, the parallel 
phenomenon of acquittal has been downplayed. This Article 
attempts to synthesize these two phenomena-the disregard 
of penal instructions and the disregard of judicial instructions 
of general applicability-under the rubric of jury nullification. 
Such analysis offers more than semantic and conceptual value. 
By changing this conceptual framework, one may re-examine 
the bases and merits of an explicit nullification instruction, 
particularly in the context of the "ordinary" criminal trial. 
We make several assertions. First, jury nullification in the 
ordinary criminal trial is a common, and perhaps increasing, 
phenomenon because nullification often occurs by means other 
than the jury's failure to adhere faithfully to the elements of 
the substantive law as charged. Nullification also occurs when 
the jury disregards oth~r instructions such as the consideration 
of punishment or the elimination of bias. In this way, nullifica-
tion is often accomplished by the jury's conscious or subcon-
scious focus on fictions, that is, on collateral issues which act 
as surrogates for the jury's true discomfort with the propriety 
of the conviction itself. As such, jury deliberation may focus on 
the reliability of evidence or on the credibility of witnesses 
when in actuality there is no real dispute about it among jury 
members. Jurors, trying to be faithful to the court's instruc-
tions, deliberate around false issues oflaw or fact because the 
underlying issues of justice or mercy are, by the judge's pro-
scription, out of bounds. As a result, substantive elements of 
the crime, particularly mens rea requirements, may be distort-
ed or misstated, or the burden of persuasion may be heightened 
well beyond the applicable standard, in order for the jury to 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(deciding that although jury nullification serves as a "necessary counter to case-
hardened judges and arbitrary prosecutors," the jury does not have to be informed of 
this option, even in civil disobedience cases) (citation omitted); United States v. 
Dellinger, 4 72 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the court trying the Chicago 
Seven should only instruct the jury to apply the law), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); 
United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1972) (refusing to permit an 
instruction to the jury that it may acquit regardless of evidence of guilt); United 
States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969) (holding that the court should 
instruct the jury that although it has the power to ignore the law, the jury's duty is 
to apply the law as interpreted by the court), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); United 
States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969) (holding that the jury should 
not be told that it can decide the case according to conscience), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
910 (1970). 
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reach a verdict that it can tolerate. This manner of deliberation 
may lead to acquittal verdicts, but not for the reasons expressly 
agreed upon inside the jury room or even for the reasons which 
the jurors themselves believe they had for the acquittal. 
Second, we assert that jury nullification is best understood 
as a community's check on judicial, prosecutorial, and police 
discretion. In communities where the population does not trust 
government and is estranged economically, culturally, or 
racially from it, nullification in the ordinary criminal trial 
becomes an inchoate political act that challenges the legitimacy 
of government itself. Jury nullification is one of the few ways 
through which a community can challenge the "power struc-
ture" with an immediate impact. 
Third, we argue that an explicit and carefully crafted nulli-
fication charge would officially recognize the nullification 
phenomena that already exists and which may be increasing 
in frequency. Such a charge would not necessarily encourage 
additional nullification, but would instead directly address it 
as it happens. Moreover, such a charge would transform the 
judicial process by providing a more rational basis for jury 
deliberation and decision making. In particular, it would allow 
jury deliberation to be an open process in which extrajudicial 
biases are aired and confronted.1° Further, those communities 
whose members are increasingly estranged from the criminal 
justice system's decision-making process will benefit indirectly 
from greater participation and, in turn, from power over the 
kinds of cases prosecuted.11 In sum, contrary to the argument 
that a nullification charge is an invitation to anarchy, 12 such 
a charge could help to control the anarchy that has already 
gripped much of the system. 
This Article attempts to give some perspective on critics' 
concern over the effectiveness and fairness of the jury system 
by discussing the nullification phenomenon in a societal 
10. The concept of extrajudicial concerns is somewhat problematic given our 
premise that issues outside the substantive elements of a crime may be relevant to 
a jury's determination of guilt or innocence and therefore by definition are not extra-
legal. Nevertheless, we use extrajudicial as a term of convenience to indicate those 
matters which are outside the usual purview of the jury in a criminal case. 
11. A fundamental premise of this Article, that nullification serves as a commu-
nity check on governmental power, assumes that the composition of juries adequately 
represents minorities. To the extent that such representation is not yet a reality, 
judicial reform must proceed on other fronts, of which a nullification instruction is 
but one. These other fronts are beyond the scope of this Article. 
12. E.g., Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1114; Moylan, 417 F.2d at 1009. 
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context. Part I examines the historical background behind jury 
nullification and its relationship to the conscience cases, which 
have in turn dictated the terms of the jurisprudential discus-
sion. Part II explores the types of nullification that occur when 
juries focus on collateral issues as surrogates for their desire 
to nullify. In particular, we will attempt to reconcile the 
proliferation of state-of-mind defenses, including spousal abuse 
syndrome, urban survival syndrome, and the increasing acquit-
tal rates seen in particular crimes in certain communities, with 
the inability of juries to bring extrajudicial concerns into 
deliberation. Part III discusses why the traditional arguments 
against jury nullification instructions do not confront contem-
porary social issues and why the traditional "right versus 
power" framework of the discussion is appropriate only in the 
context of crimes of conscience. Additionally, Part III examines 
how a nullification instruction would provide a community with 
a check upon the discretion of law enforcement and prosecu-
tion. Part IV is a description and critique of actual nullification 
instructions and of some proposed in the literature. In particu-
lar, we examine these instructions from the standpoint that 
they should adequately rationalize the deliberation process 
such that the fact-finding of the jury is not confused with 
nullification sentiment. 
Finally, Part V presents some suggestions for a nullification 
instruction and a framework for how to resolve some of the 
practical issues that an explicit instruction would raise, par-
ticularly how to balance jury empowerment with efficient 
criminal procedure. We discuss the possibility of a notice 
requirement for a nullification defense, which would add some 
deterrence to the assertion of the defense and would afford the 
prosecution an opportunity to mount a counter-nullification 
case. Notice would also expand notions of legal relevance 
throughout the trial from voir dire, to the admission of evi-
dence, and finally to deliberation. We consider the possibility 
of a bifurcated nullification instruction and deliberation: the 
jury would first reach a verdict on the "factual" guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant and then, second, consider the possibili-
ty of acquittal on the grounds that conviction would not serve 
the ends of justice. 
We hope that by rethinking nullification in a social context 
we can empower the jury and rationalize the process, rather 
than continue to gripe about a process with inadequate infor-
mation about it. In the final analysis, any true redefinition of 
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the American character must bring our collective sense of 
justice and mercy out of the shadows. Opening up the jury 
deliberation process may yet cast more light. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JURY NULLIFICATION 
A. Early English Common Law History 
and Bushell's Case 
The nullification phenomenon has political roots that can be 
traced back as early as 1544, when an English jury declined 
to convict, on charges of high treason, the then-notorious Sir 
Nicholas Throckmorton, who had openly participated in 
Wyatt's Rebellion.13 The jury acquitted Throckmorton in spite 
of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt because of his ascen-
dant political popularity. 14 
Throckmorton was subsequently brought before the Court of 
the Star Chamber, 15 which heard cases of particular impor-
tance to the Crown. 16 The binding over or summoning of 
"runaway juries" for trial and punishment in the Star Chamber 
was a common practice in England well into the seventeenth 
century.17 Juries, almost exclusively in political cases, were 
menaced and ultimately convicted· "by attaint". or prosecuted 
for giving false verdicts under oath. 18 
13. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETI', A CONCISE HlsToRY OF THE COMMON LAW 133-34 
(5th ed. 1956). 
14. Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson, Jury Nullification: A Call for 
Justice or an Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 MIL. L. REV. 131, 133 n.16 (1993). 
15. See JOHN BELLAMY, THE TuDOR LAW OF TREASON 172-73 (1979). 
16. Other cases that the Star Chamber heard involved cases of forgery, perjury, 
libel, and conspiracy. See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 23 (1988). In addition 
to reversing the jury's verdict, Throckmorton's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 215 (KB. 1554), 
the Star Chamber imprisoned the jurors themselves and fined them for their 
impermissible verdict. See BELLAMY, supra note 15, at 172-73. 
17. See THOMAS A GREEN, VERDICT AcCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 141-42 (discussing 
juries bound over to the Star Chamber). 
18. Id. False verdicts under oath were characterized as perjury. The prosecution 
of disobedient juries was purportedly for juror corruption-bribery, conflict ofinterest, 
and contempt. The only showing required to bind a jury over for the Star Chamber, 
however, was that the jury's verdict was "contrary to the evidence," at which point 
the burden of proof shifted to the jurors to establish that their decision was not a 
product of improper motive. See id. 
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The Court of the Star Chamber was abolished by Parliament 
in 1641.19 The courts' power to harass and punish juries, 
however, was retained by the common law bench through the 
remedy of attaint and the power to hold juries in summary 
contempt, which resulted in fines and imprisonment.20 The 
power to chill jury independence in cases where the Crown had 
an interest remained relatively intact until the Court of 
Common Pleas decision in Bushell's Case.21 
Bushell's Case arose from the arrest and prosecution of 
Quaker leader William Penn and his associate William Mead 
on grounds of violation of the Conventicle Act of 1670.22 The 
Conventicle Act was a harsh provision against religious free-
dom, specifically the public expression of religious beliefs in 
any manner other than in accordance with the practice of the 
Church of England.23 The law was aimed particularly at 
Catholics, who were thought to be devising a "Popish Plot" 
linked to French imperial designs. 24 
At trial, Penn and Mead stood before Sir Samuel Starling, 
Judge and Lord-Mayor of London, a group of aldermen, and a 
jury of twelve.25 In effect, Penn and Mead admitted to the 
assembly that they had preached to a large crowd but denied 
breaking any valid law.26 Judge Starling had both defendants 
19. GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 23. 
20. See generally GREEN, supra note 17, at 209-12 (describing the fining of jurors 
in the Quaker cases of the 1660s). 
21. 1 Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). 
22. Conventicle Act, 1670, 22 Car. II, ch. 1 (Eng.), reprinted in PAULL. HUGHES 
& RoBERT F. FRIES, CROWN AND PARLIAMENT IN TUooR-STuART ENGLAND 271-72 (1959); 
GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 24. On August 14, 1670, while Penn was preaching to a 
crowd on a London street corner, with Mead in close attendance, they were arrested 
for seditiously causing "a tumult" in violation of the Conventicle Act. See Scheflin, 
supra note 8, at 170. 
23. Conventicle Act, 1670, 22 Car. II, ch. 1. 
24. Though not the stated target of the law, Quakers became the main focus of 
prosecution under the Conventicle Act because of their public expression of their 
religion and the suspicion of some that the Quakers were secret Papists. See GUINTHER, 
supra note 16, at 24. Some thought that Quaker pacificism was designed to bring 
down England's military guard against invasion from the continent. Id. 
25. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 21 (1986). A record of 
the proceedings of this trial is reported in The Trial of William Penn and William 
Mead, 2 A COMPLETE COU.ECTION OF SrATE-~ AND PRocEEDINGS UPON HlGH-TREAsoN, 
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS 606 (2d ed. 1730) [hereinafter STATE TRIALS]. 
26. 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 25, at 608. In presenting their cases to the jury pro 
se, as trials for sedition did not permit representation by counsel, both defendants 
spoke eloquently of the right to free worship. See id. Penn argued that "tumult" 
required an intent to breach the peace and declared the defendants' motives com-
pletely peaceful. See id. at 610. 
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locked in the bail-dock during the balance of the trial for 
having the temerity to challenge the purposes and enforcement 
of the Conventicle Act in public. The Recorder then recited the 
undisputed facts underlying the indictment to the jury while 
Penn was said to have been heard shouting through the bars 
of the bail-dock: "I appeal to the Jury, who are my Judges, and 
this great Assembly, whether the proceedings of the Court are 
not most Arbitrary and void of all Law, in offering to give the 
Jury their charge in the absence of the Prisoners."27 
Despite threats and entreaties by the judge, the jury re-
fused to make a finding of unlawful assembly.28 Starling then 
tried to force a verdict satisfactory to the Crown by jailing 
the jury and denying them food or water.29 Two days· passed, 
and the jury returned its final verdict, not guilty for both of 
the accused.30 
Judge Starling was bound by law to enter an acquittal for 
Penn and Mead on the indicted charge; however, he fined the 
defendants and the jurors for contempt and jailed them when 
they refused to pay~31 The defendants and eight of the jurors 
soon paid their fines and were released.32 However, four of the 
jurors refused to pay their fines and remained incarcerated in 
Newgate Prison while arguing an appeal to the Court of 
Common Pleas.33 A year later, the appeal judgment was ren-
dered and the convictions were reversed. 34 The Chief Justice 
of the Court, Sir John Vaughan, pronounced that no jury could 
be punished for its verdict, whether by attaint or by fine. 35 
Thus, jury nullification was established in the common law. 
27.. Id. at 609. 
28. See Scheflin, supra note 8, at 170-71. After a short deliberation, the jury 
returned eight to four for conviction. Threats were made both from the bench and 
from seated aldermen towards the four holdouts and the jury was sent back to find 
a unanimous and "acceptable" verdict. Soon thereafter, the jury returned with a 
unanimous decision-not guilty for Mead, and guilty for Penn, but only for "speak-
ing at Gracechurch Street." Id. at 170. 
29. Id. 
30. 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 25, at 612. 
31. See Scheflin, supra note 8, at 171. 
32. See GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 27. 
33. GREEN, supra note 17, at 236. 
34. See 1 Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). 
35. Id. 
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In B1J:shell's Case, Vaughan rejected any notion of objective 
truth by which to grade a jury's verdict.36 He likened the 
individual's assessment of testimony to the varying personal 
interpretations of religious texts.37 Such variance in the un-
derstanding of the same evidence by judge and jury did not 
necessarily implicate insincerity or corruption on the part of 
the jury but, on the contrary, was the expected order of 
things.38 
Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Vaughan chose not to discuss 
the underlying politics or theology of the jury. Specifically, he 
chose not to consider the role of the jury as a check on judicial 
tyranny or as a check on the enforcement by the Crown of 
unjust laws.39 In fact, Vaughan's opinion is not reasoned in a 
way specific to crimes of conscience. The very political nature 
of the prosecution of Penn and other Quakers, howev~r, made 
jury independence a highly charged political issue. Thus, it is 
of no surprise that the precedent of Bushell's Case, though 
meaning little in the ordinary criminal matter, became very 
important to the prosecution of political crimes-in particular, 
treason, unlicensed publications, and seditious libel.40 
During this same period, the Crown, under the Stuart 
Monarchy, sought to broaden the use of the courts to purge and· 
punish those whom it viewed as subversive. The Stuart period 
was a period of inquisition in England, spear-headed by Titus 
Oates's concoction of the "Popish Plot" to assassinate Charles 
II and install a Catholic monarch.41 
36. Id. at 148, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1012-13. Most familiarly, Vaughan pronounced 
that: 
Id. 
A man cannot see by anothers eye, nor hear by anothers ear, no more can a 
man conclude or inferr the thing to be resolv'd by anothers understanding or 
reasoning; and though the verdict be right the jury give, yet they being not 
assur'd it is so from their own understanding, are forsworn, at least in foro 
conscientiae. 
37. Id. at 141, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1009. 
38. GREEN, supra note 17, at 239-49. 
39. Similarly, Vaughan did not cite to any theological doctrine of conscience or 
to the right of the jury to apply the law mercifully. It is inconceivable, however, that 
Vaughan did not realize that his opinion, limited to the issue of jury verdict non-
reviewability, would affect the ongoing debate and the law itself. 
40. See GREEN, supra note 17, at 249. 
41. Id. at 250-51. See generally JOHN POLLOCK, THE POPISH PLoT (1903) (providing 
a complete history of the alleged Popish Plot). Examples of jury-packing, prosecutorial 
and judicial misconduct, excessive· sentencing and punishment, and other 
manipulations have been documented. E.g., GREEN, supra note 17, at 251. Neverthe-
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In order to curb jury non-compliance protected from sanctions 
under Bushell's Case, the Stuart judges established the doc-
trine of seditious libel. In a seditious libel case, the jury was 
only instructed to find whether or not the defendant published 
the words in question. The seditious nature and intent of those 
words became a matter of law for the judge to decide.42 
B. American Colonial History and Zenger's Case 
The Stuart doctrine of seditious libel was exported to the 
American colonies along with the English tradition of jury 
trials. William Penn himself wrote the Frame of Government 
for the colonists of Pennsylvania, extending to its inhabitants 
civil liberties yet unrealized in England, such as freedom of 
religion and limitations on capital punishment.43 However, 
Penn retained and liberally enforced Stuart seditious libel laws 
that penalized criticism of the government.44 
The most prominent defendant to be charged with seditious 
libel in Pennsylvania was William Bradford, a printer known 
for his mocking portrayals of the colonial governor and of Penn 
in particular.45 Bradford w·as arrested twice and prosecuted 
once for printing allegedly seditious material. 46 Ultimately 
discouraged by the censorial Pennsylvania authorities, Brad-
ford moved his printing press to New York, where he became 
the publisher of the Gazette and hired a young apprentice 
named John Peter Zenger.47 
less, a number of courageous juries bucked the tide of anti-Jesuit emotion and 
acquitted defendants even during this period of political and religious oppression. See 
id. 
42. Similar doctrines parsing the fact-finding role of the judge and jury were also 
developed for homicide and unlawful assembly cases. See id. at 254. These doctrines 
were developed in response to juries, which, now immune from sanctions, arrived at 
unacceptable verdicts in political cases. See Thomas A. Green, The Jury, Seditious 
Libel, and the Criminal Law in R.H. HELMHOLZ & THOMAS A GREEN, JuR!Es, LIBEL, & 
JUSTICE: THE RoLE OF ENGLISH JURIES IN l 7TH AND 18TH CENTuRY TRIALS FOR LIBEL AND 
SLANDER 37 (1984). 
43. ·GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 27. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 27-28. 
46. Id. at 28. 
4 7. See id. at 27-28. See generol.ly JAMES ALExANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CAsE 
AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1963) (giving an account of 
Zenger's Case, based on Alexander Hamilton's notes). 
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Zenger worked as an employee for Bradford and later became 
partners with him for fifteen years.48 In 1726, Zenger left and 
started his own printing business.49 He first specialized in 
religious tracts but in 1733 began publishing the New York 
Weekly Journal. 50 The Journal was a political paper whose 
main target was William Cosby, the Royal Governor of New 
York.51 On November 2, 1734, Governor Cosby had four issues 
of the Journal publicly burned.52 On November 17th, Zenger 
was arrested and charged with seditious libel for the anti-
Cosby material in his weekly.53 
Zenger was prosecuted for seditious libel.54 At trial, Zenger's 
attorney could neither argue that the opinions published in the 
Journal were not malicious nor prove that they were factually 
based. Truth was not a defense for seditious libel, as it is under 
modern libel law, and the malicious and seditious quality of a 
statement was determined by the bench, not the jury.55 The 
jury's sole job was to find whether or not a statement was 
made or published.56 Thus precluded by the law of seditious 
libel, Zenger's attorney could only urge the jury to nullify the 
law: 
It is the Cause of Liberty; and I make no Doubt but your 
upright Conduct, this Day, will not only entitle you to the 
Love and Esteem of your Fellow-Citizens; but every Man 
who prefers Freedom to a Life of Slavery will bless you and 
honour You, as Men who have baffled the Attempt of 
Tyranny.57 
48. ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 8. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. See id. Cosby was purportedly an acquisitive, power hungry man who exacted 
large sums from the New York council and sued the former governor, Rip Van Dam, 
for half of his salary. For this and other alleged official misconduct, including electoral 
manipulations, Cosby became a generally despised figure and the target of political 
cartoons, advertising, and editorials in Zenger's journal. See Philip B. Scott, Jury 
Nullification: An Historical Perspectiue on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 389, 
410-15; see also GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 27-30 (describing Cosby's arrival and 
reputation in New York). 
52. ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 18. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 12. 
55. Id. 
56. GUINTHER, supra note 16, at 29. 
57. LIVINGSTON RUTHERFORD, JOHN PETER ZENGER 123 (1941). 
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After summations, the jury retired to deliberate. They returned 
shortly thereafter with a not-guilty verdict, and Zenger was 
acquitted.58 
Zenger and his fellow publishers printed transcripts of the 
trial, and word of the verdict spread throughout the colonies 
and back to England.59 Though not a landmark precedent in 
the way that Bushell's Case was, the Zenger's Case verdict 
effectively ended the prosecution of seditious libel cases in the 
colonies. 60 
. C. Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Developments 
The nineteenth-century American common law continued the 
jury nullification trend in crimes of conscience cases. However, 
the jurisprudence of jury nullification began to shift. The 
common law tradition and American constitutional history 
through the early nineteenth century held that the jury was 
the arbiter of the facts and of the law, a formulation consistent 
with jury nullification.61 This recognition of the plenary power 
of the jury was not inconsistent with the revolutionary spirit 
of a young nation that had defied its sovereign in declaring 
independence, and with that, its own sense of justice.62 
It was in a case involving the highly charged political issue 
of slavery that the winds began to change. United States v. 
Battiste63 concerned the prosecution of a sailor who allegedly 
58. Scott, supra note 51, at 415. 
59. See ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 36-37. . 
60. See id. at 34-35. Arguably, Zenger's Case also stands for a full appreciation 
of trial by jury and a deep distaste for excessive bail and fines. 
61. See William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Mar-
shall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 915-16 (1978). 
62. Professor Nelson notes that the transfer of the law-finding function from the 
jury to the judge reflected a shift from a conception of law as a mechanism that 
preserves local power, builds local consensus, and mirrors shared values, to a 
mechanism that enforce·s personal choices, resolves individual disputes, and protects 
private control over economic resources. WILLIAM NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE 
COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MAssAcHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1700-1830, at 
173-74 (1975). These considerations and the development of certain jury controls in 
the civil context may be less applicable in the criminal context, which suggests that 
the policies inherent in the earlier law-finding function of the jury may still be more 
relevant in the criminal context. See id. at 27 n.37 (noting that the transformation 
from jury law-finding to fact-fmding in Massachusetts did not occur as rapidly in 
criminal cases as it did in civil cases). 
63. 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545). 
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had seized a black man in Massachusetts with the. intent to 
sell him into servitude. Justice Story, concerned that a North-
ern abolitionist jury would summarily convict the defendant, 
instructed: 
[I]t [is] the most sacred constitutional right of every party 
accused of a crime, that the jury should respond as to the 
facts, and the court as to the law. It is the duty of the court 
to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the 
jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court.64 
Justice Story found that the statute under which the defendant 
was charged was not intended to cover sailors who h&d neither 
enslaved a "negro or mullatto" directly nor had title or interest 
in the slaves.65 The jury acquitted the defendant.66 To that 
extent, Justice Story's counter-nullification instruction prevent-
ed a conviction. 67 
Not coincidentally, the Battiste decision arrived on the cusp 
of a particularly volatile time in the history of the American 
jury. Under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,68 "aiders and 
abettors" of alleged fugitive slaves could be held liable both 
criminally and civilly.69 Massachusetts and Pennsylvaniajurors 
in particular were celebrated for nullifying judicial instructions 
and finding for defendants in "aiding and abetting" cases.70 A 
number of trial judges at the time refused defense requests to 
charge juries that they had the independent right to find the 
law in fugitive slave cases.71 Nevertheless, northern jurors 
often found ways to acquit defendants, following their con-
sciences and disregarding the judge's instructions. 
The precedential significance of Battiste remained somewhat 
unclear until Spar{ and Hansen u. United States,12 sixty years 
later. In Spar{ and Hansen, members of the crew of the Ameri-
64. Id. at 1043. Justice Story presided over this case as the Circuit Justice. 
65. Id. at 1045. 
66. Id. 
67. Cf. Scheflin, supra note 8, at 177-78 (noting that Justice Story, while 
conceding the jury's power to nullify, successfully persuaded the jurors that they did 
not have the moral right to do so). 
68. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864). 
69. See RoBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
190-91 (1975). 
70. Id. at 191. 
71. Id. 
72. 156 U.S. 51 (1894). 
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can vessel, Hesper, were charged with and convicted for mur-
der. One of the issues on appeal was the trial court's refusal 
to instruct the jury that, as an alternative to murder, the jury 
could convict the defendant of manslaughter. The trial court 
had instead instructed the jury that, although it had the power 
to return a verdict of manslaughter, any verdict other than 
murder, ifa felonious homocide had been committed, would be 
improper.73 
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that the 
trial judge's instruction was correct and holding that, although 
the jury had the power to ignore the judge's charge on the law, 
it had no right to do so.74 According to Justice Harlan, a jury 
that disobeys a judge's instruction on the law acts contrary to 
the law, but the judge cannot set aside an acquittal or direct 
a conviction. 75 
This formulation of a jury's power to disobey a judge's 
instruction-the power to nullify versus its right to do so-has 
dominated much of the case law and scholarship since Justice 
Harlan's opinion. 76 Spar{ and Hansen presented a relatively 
narrow· issue to the Court: whether a judge may refuse to 
instruct a jury on a particular matter of law if the judge 
deems that law to be inapplicable to the facts presented at 
trial.77 According to Justice Harlan, it is not error not to 
instruct a jury on inapplicable law.78 A narrower reading of 
Sparfand Hansen might suggest the following issue: whether 
a judge may instruct a jury that its failure to follow the in-
structions would be inconsistent with the law, though beyond 
the court's power to control. The Court answered that question 
in the affirmative, without breaking from prior common law 
and constitutional understandings of the jury's proper function 
and power.79 Given either reading, Spar{ and Hansen has 
73. See id. at 60-61. The trial judge charged: "[A]s I have said in this case, if a 
felonious homicide has been committed at all, of which I repeat you are the judges, 
there is nothing to reduce it below the grade of murder." Id. at 60 (emphasis omitted). 
74. Id. at 101-03. . 
75. Id. at 106. 
76. See infra Part III. 
77. See 156 U.S. at 63, 103. 
78. See id. at 106 ("We are of the opinion that the court below did not err in 
saying to the jury that they could not consistently with the law ... find the defen-
dants guilty of manslaughter or of any offense less than the one charged .... "). 
79. See id. 
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come to mean that jury nullification instructions are imper-
missible in a federal court. 80 
Thus, the common law history of jury nullification, from the 
birth of the Star Chamber and through the nineteenth century, 
is a composite of "conscience cases," in which juries have 
declared their independence from tyrannical laws enforced 
against political, social, and religious dissidents. 81 The use of 
jury nullification as a political tool continues into recent times. 
D. The Vietnam War Resister Cases 
Many, if not all, of the issues in Bushell's Case, Zenger's 
Case, and the Fugitive Slave cases were again articulated in 
the Vietnam War resister cases. The war resister cases share 
a common fact pattern. In each case, the government prose-
cuted one or more anti-war activists who had broken laws 
during protests, usually through acts of civil disobedience. 
These acts ranged from the destruction of government prop-
erty, 82 to violation of the Selective Service Act,83 conspiracy to 
aid in draft evasion,84 malicious destruction, and unlawful 
entry.85 
In a number of cases, the defense requested a nullification 
instruction that would have permitted a juror's own sense of 
justice to enter into the deliberation and override the judge's 
instructions on the law. 86 In each case, the court refused to 
give a nullification instruction, and in some cases the court 
80. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1969). 
81. Of course, Spar{ and Hansen is not a political case, and Battiste is political 
only in the sense that Justice Story's charge responded to the threat of a politically 
motivated nullification conviction against the defendant. See Scheflin, supra note 8, 
at 178. Much of the reasoning in Battiste in opposition to jury nullification responds 
to this purported fear of nullification convictions. See United States v. Battiste, 24 
F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545). The court argued at length that 
a jury that is the arbiter of the law endangers the defendant's due process rights and 
threatens the prosecution. Id. 
82. E.g., Simpson, 460 F.2d 515; Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002. 
83. E.g., United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1969). 
84. E.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). 
85. E.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
86. For a discussion of nullification instructions in Vietnam era cases, see 
William M. Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 71 
(1969); Joseph L. Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57 
YALE REV. 484 (1968). 
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instructed the jury that the reasons behind the defendant's 
acts of civil disobedience were irrelevant to the issue of 
criminal liability.87 This counter-nullification instruction also 
served to negate arguments by the defense that acts of civil 
disobedience could be justified by necessity, defense of others, 
emergency, moral compulsion, or choice of the lesser evil.88 
· In at least one war resister case, the trial court attempted 
to exert more extensive jury control and was reversed on 
appeal. In United States v. Spock,89 the trial court had in-
structed the jury to deliver special verdicts in order to ensure 
that the jury could not nullify. The Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit reversed the defendants' convictions for conspiracy 
to aid draft evaders, holding that the ·special verdicts were 
prejudicial and improper because they sought to control the 
jury's right to unfettered deliberation.90 In discussing the right 
of a jury to deliberate, the court recognized the power of a jury 
to acquit notwithstanding a factual finding of liability.91 One 
can liken the court's disavow~! of special verdicts, particularly 
in a political case like Spock, to earlier resistance against the 
Stuart formulation of seditious libel, which also sought, by 
parsing issues of fact and law, to control the jury's power to 
deliberate and nullify the judge's charge. 
In contrast to Spock, most of the other war resister cases 
follow a more familiar pattern, relying on Spar{ and Hansen 
for the rule that a jury nullification instruction is impermissi-
ble in federal court because the jury has no "right" to disregard 
the judge's instruction.92 
87. See, e.g., Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1137-38 n.54. 
88. See id. 
89. 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). 
90. Id. at 181. 
91. Id. at 182. 
92. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1969). The only case that truly stands 
out among the war resister cases is United States v. Dougherty, largely for the 
comprehensive dissent of Judge Bazelon. 473 F.2d 1113, 1138-48 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(Bazelon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (maintaining that nullification 
"permits the Jury to bring to bear on the criminal process a sense of fairness and 
particularized justiceD). 
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II. PRESENT-DAY NULLIFICATION ISSUES 
Given the political history behind jury nullification, it is 
ironic that the current debate on verdicts takes place not in the 
rarified air of crimes of conscience but in the superheated 
atmosphere of notorious crimes of passion. The media coverage 
surrounding these verdicts has obscured the relationship be-
tween political and apolitical cases. In each type of case, juries 
have grappled with issues of justice and mercy despite strong 
evidence of guilt. Recent commentators have failed to acknowl-
edge that the reactions of present day juries are directly 
analogous to jury reactions recorded at least as far back as the 
1950s.93 
Indeed, in the wake of hung juries in the trials of the 
Menendez brothers and the jury acquittal of Lorena Bobbitt, 
there has been much discussion in the media about whether 
the use of criminal defenses, such -as "victimization" or "abuse 
excuse," has increased. 94 Indeed, such defenses have been 
asserted in both celebrated cases as well as in the relatively 
obscure.95 What has been forgotten in the spate of publicity 
93. Cf KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 223-26 (discussing juries' willingness 
to acquit in cases involving reprisals against violent aggressors). 
94. See generally DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5 (arguing that the "abuse·excuse" is 
being used with greater frequency and success and noting that it is the subject of daily 
discussion on radio and television talk shows). Indeed, justification defenses in highly 
charged cases, offered to the jury and accepted apparently at face value, have been 
criticized by Professor Dershowitz as "lawless invitation[s) to vigilantism." Id. at 27. 
Professor Dershowitz also calls the apparent proliferation of these defenses a "national 
abdication of personal responsibility." Id. at 41. 
95. Some examples of these defenses include: 
1. Mob frenzy defense: the defense of Damian Williams, accused of.beating truck 
driver, Reginald Denny, during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Williams was 
acquitted of felony charges in his state trial; 
2. Black rage defense: the proposed, but later abandoned, defense theory of Colin 
Ferguson, accused of shooting six people to death on a Long Island Railroad 
commuter train; 
3. Abused child defense: the defense used by the Menendez brothers, accused of 
shooting their parents to death. The brothers were tried before two separate 
juries that were both unable to reach a verdict resulting in mistrials for the 
brothers; 
4. Battered spouse defense: the defense put forward by Lorena Bobbitt, accused 
of severing her husband's penis. The jury returned a verdict of not-guilty by 
reason of temporary insanity; 
5. Urban survival syndrome: the defense of Damion Osby, accused of shooting two 
unarmed African American men in a parking lot; 
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about these cases and in the outcry that their verdicts have 
produced is that the results of these trials are neither particu-
larly new nor novel. Obscured by the media frenzy is the extent 
to which jury nullification may be at work. 
Before the apparent proliferation of these types of cases, 
critics had expressed discomfort with justification defenses.96 
The rise of the insanity defense, for example, has been char-
acterized for years as "almost wholly dominat[ing]" the area of 
criminal responsibility.97 As Professor Alan Scheflin notes, a 
jury is asked to determine criminal responsibility by focusing 
on, among other factors, the defendant's criminal intent.98 In 
the insanity defense context, Scheflin argues, the jury is asked 
to make a decision involving moral, legal,. and medical judg-
ments in deciding whether the defendant had the requisite 
psychiatric condition to exculpate the defendant of criminal 
responsibility.99 Thus, the jury must act as the "referee in a 
battle of experts despite the lack of expertise on their part to 
make a responsible and intelligent choice. "100 According to 
Scheflin, the rise of various insanity defenses has obscured the 
role and function of the jury because a guilty verdict should 
6. Steroid rage defense: the defense of Troy Mentzler, accused of tossing rocks at 
cars on an interstate highway; 
7. Fetal trimethadione syndrome: the defense of Eric Smith, accused of beating a 
4-year-old to death, attributing the action to his mother's epilepsy medication 
taken during pregnancy; and 
8. Adopted-child syndrome: the defense of accused serial killer, Joel Rifkin, who 
allegedly murdered 17 women. 
See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 321-41 (providing a "glossary of abuse excuses," 
including the mob frenzy defense); Walter Goodman, Examining the Abuse Defense 
in Trials, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at C20 (reviewing Don't Blame Me, a television 
special surveying different victimization defenses, and pointing to the influence of talk 
shows for "spreading the notion that everyone is a victim"); Gregory, supra note 5, 
at 30-31 (discussing the black rage, urban survival, and battered spouse defenses); 
John T. McQuiston, A Novel Insanity Defense for Joel Rifkin, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 
1994, at Bl (describing the adopted-child defense); Margot Slade, supra note 2, at B20 
(noting the trend of defendants to portray themselves as victims by creating such 
defenses as steroid rage, fetal trimethadione syndrome, and others). 
96. See, e.g., Scheflin, supra note 8, at 193-94 (discussing the role of the jury in 
criminal responsibility defenses, such as insanity, and in mitigation factors, such as 
poverty). 
97. Id. 
98. See id. 
99. Id. at 194; cf. Debra West, Accused's Words at Core of Insanity Defense, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, at 58 (illustrating the various considerations in a New York case 
involving an insanity defense). 
100. Scheflin, supra note 8, at 194. 
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represent the community's decision that the defendant's con-
duct warrants moral condemnation.101 
The jury's range of choices in determining criminal respon-
sibility need not be seen as so limited. While some or all of 
these defenses may be quite legitimate-indeed more than a 
few have been successful-the debate concerning their propri-
ety would be informed greatly by some indication of whether 
the juries consider these defenses on their own terms or merely 
as surrogates for impermissible concerns that a nullification 
instruction would otherwise permit.102 Moreover, the broader 
conclusions drawn by some social commentators relating to the 
apparent proliferation of "abuse excuse" defenses have assumed 
a distinctly political tone and are often linked to a conservative 
agenda. 103 Unless the jury deliberation process is rationalized, 
however, there can be no real basis upon which to make an 
informed analysis of the actual reasons behind the outcome of 
trials involving "abuse excuse" defenses or any other defenses 
where there is room for nullification. 
A. "Inside the Jury Room" 
In the television documentary, Inside the Jury Room, a jury 
seized upon a fact-finding fiction to justify a result that nulli-
fied the court's instructions on the law .104 Inside the Jury Room 
followed the trial of Leroy Reed, a mentally impaired defen-
dant, who was· tried for violating a Minnesota law which 
forbade former felons from carrying guns. 105 Reed had bought 
the gun because he wanted to become a private investigator 
101. See id. 
102. The concern may in fact be overstated because cases in which an insanity 
defense goes to a jury are extremely rare. For example, in New York State, it has been 
estimated that only 3 in every 1000 cases propose an insanity defense, and of that 
number, only 7% are heard by a jury; the rest are concluded through plea bargain or 
other resolution. See West, supra note 99, at 58. Moreover, notwithstanding suspicions 
about the ability of juries to understand insanity defenses, all diminished capacity 
defenses claim that the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea and thus should not 
be found guilty of the crime charged. Thus, a jury's finding ofinsanity is, in actuality, 
a determination that the defendant's conduct does not warrant the community's moral 
condemnation. 
103. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
104. Frontline #410: Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986) 
(transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
105. Id. (transcript at 2). 
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and believed from watching his favorite television program that 
all one needed to do to become a private investigator was to 
carry a pistol. 106 In fact, the defendant was so naive that he 
handed the sales slip for the gun to a detective when asked for 
identification. The receipt was taken to the sheriffs office 
whereupon Reed was instructed to get the gun.107 When he du-
tifully presented himself with his new gun, he was arrested.108 
The elements of the crime were straightforward. All the pro-
secution had to establish was that Reed was a former felon and 
that he owned a gun. The court denied the defense's request 
to have a nullification instruction given to the jury.109 The 
judge, however, did permit defense counsel to present a "nullifi-
cation summation" through which counsel exhorted the jury to 
employ mercy and common sense to acquit the defendant. 
Rather than simply acquit Reed because the circumstances 
indicated prosecutorial overreaching and misjudgment, the 
jurors finally reached the tenuous factual conclusion that Reed 
did not have any knowledge that he was carrying a weapon 
because he had a diminished intellectual capacity. 110 The jury 
reached this conclusion despite the defendant's own testimony 
that he bought the gun and wanted to carry it _because a gun 
was an accoutrement of a famous televison character, the 
"Equalizer."m Indeed, the jury's anguish lay not in their 
concern that they consciously were violating their oath as 
jurors; on the contrary, much of their difficulty was created by 
their reliance upon tortured fictions which they needed to erect 
in order to support their final conclusion on the facts. 
This is a kind of "nullification by misdirection," where 
surrogate issues within the jury's fact-finding province are 
deliberated, and where fictions are created to reach a result 
consistent with the jury's sense of justice. This kind of jury 
behavior clouds the deliberation process, obscures the meaning 
of the verdict, and consequently undermines respect for the 
jury system as a whole. 112 
106. Id. 
107. Id. (transcript at 4). 
108. Id. (transcript at 5). 
109. Id. (transcript at 11). 
110. Id. (transcript at 15). 
111. Id. (transcript at 2). 
112. As Jeffrey Abramson notes: 
[J]urors are discouraged from openly deliberating about the justice of enforcing 
the law and are no doubt forced frequently into smuggling their views on the 
justice oflaw into 'approved debate' about the evidence or facts .... Would not 
the quality of the debate ... be better if jurors were told that such debate was 
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B. The American Jury 
The phenomenon of seizing on collateral issues in order to 
arrive at a merciful verdict is neither rare, nor isolated, nor 
new; What happened during the deliberations at the trial of 
Leroy Reed is typical of deliberating juries. A study by Harry 
Kalven and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury, examined several 
thousand jury verdicts. 113 This study remains an authoritative 
source in revealing the operation of the jury system, ·even 
though it relied on data now almost forty years old. 114 
The Kalven & Zeisel study used judges both as subjects and 
as reporters. By mailed questionnaire, judges were asked, 
regarding the cases tried before them: (1) how the jury decided 
the case, (2) how they would have decided the case had it been 
a bench trial, and (3) to provide some descriptions and evalua-
tions of the case, the counsel, and the parties. 115 Because the 
study tracks instances solely where the presiding judge and the 
jury disagreed on the outcome of a particular trial and is based 
exclusively on reports by the judge, 116 it is impossible to make 
any definitive pronouncements about jury nullification. Never-
theless, the study offers powerful insights into the deliberation 
process of juries, because presiding judges have firsthand 
exposure to the same evidence and arguments. 117 
The Kalven & Zeisel study reinforces the notion that nulli-
fication occurs in many more cases than just cases where there 
may be jury dissatisfaction with a particular law or where the 
outcome would conflict with a jury's sense of conscience or 
religious conviction. 118 Nullification is often simply a check on 
part of their function, that we cherish trial by jury precisely because we expect 
ordinary citizens to repudiate laws, or instances of law enforcement, that are 
repugnant to their consciences? 
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 67 (1994). 
113. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 33 & n.1{including3576 criminal trials 
occurring mainly during 1954-1955 and 1958). 
114. See id. Professors Kalven and Zeisel estimated that, in 1955, 60,000 criminal 
trials were tried to a verdict in the United States. Id. at 12. 
115. Id. at 45 n.l, 56-57 {finding that juries and judges disagreed on the outcome 
in 24.6% of the sample cases). 
116. Id. at 45 n.l. 
117. See id. at 94-96 {explaining why judges are a reliable source in locating the 
areas of disagreement between judge and jury). 
118. See generally id. at 104-17 (determining that jurors commonly nullify when 
they feel that the probable sentence will be too severe for the crime committed). 
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prosecutorial discretion. Many juries nullify simply by bringing 
extralegal concerns into their deliberations or by engaging in 
fictions about the elements of the crime or the credibility of the 
evidence.119 
Kalven and Zeisel termed the extralegal exercise as "the 
liberation hypothesis. "120 Although careful not to label this 
"liberation" as a "jury nullification," Kalven and Zeisel studied 
cases in which the jury disagreed with the judge's outcome 
based not only upon evidentiary difficulties but also upon the 
jury's differing sentiments and values. 121 According to Kalven 
and Zeisel, the underlying jury sentiment gives direction to the 
resolution of the evidentiary doubt, and the evidentiary doubt 
provides a condition for a response to the sentiment.122 Thus, 
the jury's sentiment works to liberate it from the confines of 
the evidence. 123 As Kalven and Zeisel observe: 
We know, from other parts of our jury study, that the jury 
does-not often consciously and explicitly yield to sentiment 
in the teeth of the law. Rather it yields to sentiment in the 
. apparent process of resolving doubts as to evidence. The 
119. Id. at 166-67 (offering two explanations for judge-jury disagreement: (1) the 
credibility hypothesis, disagreement over an item of proof, and (2) the reasonable 
doubt standard, where a "jury will tolerate less doubt in convicting than will the 
judge"). 
120. Id. at 486 (defining the liberation hypothesis as "the yielding to sentiment 
in the guise of evaluating factual doubt"). 
121. · Id. at 164-66. 
122. Id. 
123. For example, in the first trial of the four police officers accused of beating 
Rodney King, the jury refused to convict Officer Laurence Powell for using deadly 
force against King. Despite the testimony of four eyewitnesses that Powell landed the 
initial blows to King's head, the jury discarded the testimony, in part, because it was 
not corroborated by 15 blurry seconds of videotape. See D.M. Osborne, Reaching for 
Doubt, AM. LAW., Sept. 1992, at 65. For the majority of the Simi Valley jurors who 
had a "reverence for police officers as guardians of the social order," the explicit and 
shocking videotape actually undermined the prosecution's case. Id. 
In the trials of Damian Williams and Henry Watson, who were accused of beating 
truckdriver Reginald Denny during the Los Angeles riots after the Rodney King 
verdicts, the jury also saw explicit videotape evidence and heard testimony that 
Williams had threatened to "hurt and kill people." Edward J. Boyer, No Threats Made, 
Denny Juror Contends; Trial: Contradicting Televised Claims by an Alternate Panelist, 
Juror 251 Acknowledges That Tempers Flared. But She Says That No One's "Personal 
Safety• Was Jeopardized, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1993, at B3. One juror explained, 
however, that she had a reasonable doubt that either defendant had a specific intent 
to kill Denny because the witness placed the statement at a time before the Rodney 
King verdicts came out. Id. 
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jury, therefore, is able to conduct its revolt from the law 
within the etiquette of resolving issues of fact. 124 
Whether one describes the jury's revolt from the law as a form 
of "etiquette" or as a surrogate for nullification, the result is 
the same-the jury has decided to acquit notwithstanding the 
evidence. 
The tendency of the jury in the 1950s to use surrogates for 
nullification has analogues in the well-publicized _verdicts of 
the past decade. For example, when a defendant asserts a self-
defense argument, juries tend to expand the doctrine, showing 
what Kalven and Zeisel describe as "an impatience with the 
nicety of the law's boundaries. "125 Kalven and Zeisel discern 
this trend particularly in self-defense cases in which there has 
been a history of prior abuse or unfaithfulness on the part of 
the victim.126 The juries apparently expand the notions of self-
defense either to acquit the defendant or to find guilt on lesser 
charges.127 Thus, at least in the area of self-defense, the 
appearance of surrogate nullification strategies is not a new 
phenomenon. 128 Whatever moves juries in the 1990s was 
equally persuasive to juries forty years ago. 
C. The Bobbitt Jury 
The tendency of the jury to expand notions of self-defense 
could have been at work during the jury deliberations leading 
to the finding of temporary insanity in the highly publicized 
Lorena Bobbitt case. The Bobbitt case involved a woman who 
claimed that she was systematically beaten and abused by her 
husband, leading her to cut off her husband's penis while he 
slept. 129 Her defense at trial was that at the time of the act 
124. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 165. 
125. Id. at 240-41. 
126. See id. at 231-36. 
127. Id. 
128. See ABRAMSON, supra note 112, at 94-95 (recounting an instance from 
fourteenth-century England where the trial jury in a heat-of-passion case found 
different facts than did the inquest jury and acquitted the defendant on grounds of 
self-defense). 
129. See David Margolick, Lorena Bobbitt Acquitted in Mutilation of Her Husband, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1994, § 1, at 1 (reporting on the trial and verdict). 
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she was temporarily insane and lacked any rational under-
standing of the circumstances. 130 
By the end of the deliberations, the jury unanimously be-
lieved her defense.131 However, they initially had split on 
whether to acquit or to convict.132 Yet, they quickly moved to 
a point where nine jurors fav~red acquittal and three held out 
for a conviction. 133 What is most interesting is that a key piece 
of evidence discussed by holdout jurors to favor .acquittal was 
a statement made by a police officer during his interview with 
Lorena Bobbitt on the night of the act. 134 Despite Bobbitt's 
detailed narrative of her actions prior and subsequent to the 
dismemberment, when the officer asked her whether she 
"didn't know what was happening," she responded affirma-
tively.135 This interview persuaded the holdout jurors to con-
clude that Bobbitt did not have the mens rea required to 
convict her. 136 
Whether the Bobbitt jury acquitted based solely on a faithful 
interpretation of the elements of the substantive charge or 
based on an expansion of the notion of self-defense is unclear. 
Given the public's interest in this case, however, it would have 
been helpful to have had a nullification instruction in order to 
understand the true motivations of the jurors, unfettered by 
the constraints of their present oath. 
D. The Police and the Community 
In instances where the police used an unusual or excessive 
amount of force in arresting a suspect who resisted with 
violence, Kalven and Zeisel found that juries tended to show 
"a special indulgence" toward the defendant.137 Moreover, in an 
130. Id. 
131. Videotape Interviews with anonymous Bobbitt Jurors, Courtroom Teleuision 
Network (1994) (videotapes on file with the Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform). 
132. Id. at tape 2. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at tapes 1-2. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at tape 1. 
137. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 236--40. Kalven and Zeise! also discuss 
situations in which the jury acquits "in protest against a police or prosecution practice 
that it considers improper." Id. at 318-23. 
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assault case where the defendant was brutally treated by the 
arresting officers, the presiding judge reported: 
[I]nhuman treatment of the defendant throughout the 
arrest and after the arrest made the jury feel ... that he 
had received unusual punishment and the verdict was 
prompted to discipline the officers which, in the Court's 
opinion, the jury was entitled to do. While the Court could 
have dismissed the treatment angle and based its decision 
on the assault, it is very understandable how the jury 
reached its verdict. As a matter of fact, the rough treat~ 
ment of prisoners by arresting authorities is so well known 
that it is difficult to get convictions where police or prose-
cuting detectives are involved. 138 
This 1950s phenomenon has repeated itself more recently, 
albeit on a community:..wide basis and regardless of whether 
there has been any evidence of police misconduct. In fact, jury 
trends indicate that African American and Latino communities 
express general estrangement from the police and adopt, in 
effect, a presumption against police witnesses through their . 
verdicts. 139 In cases involving police testimony in Bronx Coun-
ty, New York, juries with a high proportion of minority jurors 
were more willing to acquit minority defendants even when 
there existed clear evidence of guilt. 140 
A similar phenomenon has occurred in Brooklyn, New York, 
where poor people and people of color make up a sizable 
percentage of the population.141 In that borough, jury verdicts 
in gun possession cases from 1990 through 1993 were a statis-
tical anomaly. According to figures obtained from the Office of 
the Kings County District Attorney, acquittal rates in gun 
possession cases ran as high or higher than acquittal rates of 
prohibition violators at the height of the Prohibition Era.142 
138. Id. at 320. 
139. See, e.g., John Kifner, Bronx Juries: .A Defense Dream, A Prosecution 
Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1988, at Bl. 
140. Id. 
141. Although whites are still the largest group in Brooklyn, they are not a 
Jllajority. In 1990, they numbered 1,078,549, constituting only 47% of the borough's 
total population. See Bob Liff, Diversity Key to City's Most Populous Borough, 
NEWSDAY, Mar. 3, 1991, at 2. This figure includes 155,000 Latinos who identified 
themselves as white. Blacks comprised the second largest group, with a population 
of 872,305, or 38% of the population. Id. 
142. Compare Memorandum from the Office of the Kings County District Attorney 
to Professor Dorfman (July 7, 1994) (reporting gun possession acquittal rates) (on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) with KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra 
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Brooklyn juries were acquitting in gun possession cases at an 
average rate of 56%, in contrast to an overall acquittal rate of 
approximately 35% and in sharp contrast to a rate of 28. 7% in 
narcotics cases during the same period. 143 
These results are inconsistent with data indicating support 
for gun control legislation by Kings County residents and 
among people of color in general. 144 Thus, it seems unlikely 
that Brooklyn juries were nullifying the law because of some 
conscious revolt against. gun legislation in the way that Pro-
hibition juries revolted against the Prohibition. Neither is gun 
legislation unpopular. law reminiscent of the "conscience 
cases."145 Rather, the compelling conclusion is that Brooklyn 
juries were not nullifying in simple gun possession cases to 
protest the gun laws but to check prosecutorial discretion. 
In addition,. because police testimony in simple gun posses-
sion cases is often less professional than in drug sale or posses-
sion cases, juries may be discounting police testimony, as 
evidenced by the high rate of acquittal verdicts. In drug 
cases-often "buy and bust" operations-police testimony is 
given by undercover officers, experienced and trained in 
note 6, at 292 n.10 (noting that federal juries acquitted liquor violators at the average 
rate of 60% in New York City). 
143. See Memorandum from the Office of the Kings County District Attorney to 
Professor Dorfman, supra note 142, at 2. But cf Memorandum from the Office.ofthe 
Kings County District Attorney to Professor Dorfman 1 (Nov .. 20, 1995) [hereinafter 
Kings County Update) (reporting acquittal rates according to data released by the 
State Division of Criminal Justice Services) (on file with the University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform). 
More recent figures indicate that, in 1994, gun possession cases resulted in only 
35% acquittals at trial. Kings County Update, supra, at 1. More startling, in 1995, 
gun possession cases have resulted in only 10% acquittals, which actually exceeded 
the prosecutorial success rate for felony trial cases overall. This sharp decline in the 
1994 and 1995 figures seems to be a result of a change in policy and practice of the 
Kings County District Attorney's Office in response to the 1993 acquittal rate figures. 
The Kings County District Attorney's Office may now be offering many more misde-
meanor plea bargains as well as lesser included-offense plea bargains with shorter 
sentences to gun possession defendants, because the Office knows that Brooklyn juries 
will very likely acquit a defendant in a "garden variety" gun possession case. The 
result of this practice of weeding-out the cases that may be in the least bit problematic 
at trial is a much higher trial conviction rate. See infra notes 254-55 and accompany-
ing text. This change in acquittal rates, however, does not necessarily indicate a 
change in the dynamics of the Brooklyn jury. 
144. "[M]ajorities of women, blacks and Democrats [nationwide thought) stricter 
gun control laws [would) reduce violent crime." Jack Nelson, Most Support President 
on New Gun Laws, L.A TIMES MIRROR, Dec. 10, 1993, at 24. 
145. See supra Part I; see also Katherine Q. Seelye, In Gun Vote, An Odd Hero for 
Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at 10 (nearly 80% of Americans favor some form 
of gun control). · 
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testifying before juries. 146 In gun possession cases, on the other 
hand, the jury hears testimony from front-line patrol or beat 
officers. The community's response, as reflected by the jury's 
response to police officer testimony in general, becomes more 
of a critical factor. The extent to which this response amounts 
to nullification of the standard charge-instructing that a 
police officer's testimony is no less credible than a civil-
ian's-remains an open question. It is quite possible, however, 
that jurors consider these police officers to be presumptively 
non-credible and thereby nullify the judge's charge. 
In addition, the jury sometimes considers the harm resulting 
from the criminal behavior to be trivial. For example, a jury 
may refuse to convict defendants of forcible robbery when the 
stolen amounts were de minimis.147 In these situations, nullifi-
cation most clearly operates as a community check on prosecu-
torial discretion; "the jury has a somewhat narrower view than 
the prosecutor or the legislator of what constitutes an offense 
serious enough to rise to the dignity of the criminal law."148 
This kind of sentiment operates in the gun possession cases as 
well, so long as there is no evidence that the gun was used 
wrongfully. 
Kalven and Zeisel stress that it is not the seriousness of the 
crime that triggers what they term, the de minimis jury 
response, since these types of disagreements cut across crime 
categories. Thus, jury reaction to de minimis crimes is not 
necessarily a criticism of the wisdom of any particular law; 
rather, it is a cominent upon a particular law's application in 
a given situation against a particular individual. 149 
The message that Brooklyn juries are sending through their 
gun possession verdicts remains unclear. Is the message an 
expression of dissatisfaction with gun laws, perceptions of 
unequal enforcement of the laws, the nature of the police 
146. E.g., People v. Wharton, 549 N.E.2d 462 (N.Y. 1989); People v. Kelsey, 606 
N.Y. S.2d 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
14 7. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 258-85 (applying the term "de minimis" to 
refer to circumstances where there is trivial harm, no harm, cured harm, reluctance 
to prosecute, small social harm, marginal illegality, or a "plague on both houses" 
situation). 
148. Id. at 259. 
149. See id. at 345-46. For example, ajury refused to convict a bowling alley owner 
for violating child labor laws, where the activity of the defendant could be interpreted 
as merely trying to keep youth employed and out of trouble. The jury was not hostile 
to child labor laws in general. Rather, the verdict may have been the jury's attempt 
to do equity where the policy behind the law was not implicated. Id. 
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presence in minority communities, or are they merely a rec-
ognition that firearms are a fact oflife in the urban landscape? 
Because these issues presumably remain undiscussed in the 
jury room-the judge's instructions proscribe such discus-
sions-we may only take the verdicts at face value or surmise 
an answer without an empirical or even anecdotal basis. 
E. Other Examples of Jury Revolt 
Kalven and Zeise! report circumstances in which the conduct 
of the victims may lead juries to apply tort concepts, such as 
contributory negligence or assumption of risk, even though 
these concepts are inapplicable in a criminal context. 15° For 
example, one jury acquitted a defendant of homicide charges 
where the victims had been playing "chicken" with the defen-
dant's automobile. The judge concluded that "[b]ecause the jury 
did not follow the charge of the court, they saw some evidence 
of contributory negligence on part of person assaulted. [Howev-
er,] [c]ontributory negligence is no defense in the laws of this 
state to criminal actions."151 
Kalven and Zeise! reason that, in certain instances, such as 
where there has been restitution by the defendant, the jury's 
willingness to acquit may take into account circumstances 
relevant to sentencing and apply them as relevant to the 
determination of guilt. 152 Kalven and Zeise! conclude that this 
application indicates jury confusion over the purposes of tort 
and criminal law, where the former resolves private disputes 
and the latter represents societal sanctions and values.153 This 
tendency, however, may not be indicative of any confusion at 
all. Because juries are both factfinders as well as surrogates 
for the prosecution's client, the State, they are in the best 
position to evaluate the harm inflicted. 
The Kalven and Zeise! Study did not reveal any contempo-
rary law against which the jury could be said to be revolting, 
as juries had against the Prohibition laws. 154 The study did 
find, however, that juries were hostile to sumptuary laws, 
150. Id. at 242-57. 
151. Id. at 243. 
152. Id. at 269. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 286. 
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which regulate activities such as gambling, gaming, the pur-
chase and consumption ofliquor, and drunken driving. 155 Most 
significantly, the study concluded that the recurring theme 
with regard to jury antipathy toward these types of cases was 
not that the juries considered the laws themselves to be unjust, 
but rather "that the prosecution of the particular defendant 
[seemed] to be selective and to violate the ideal of evenhanded 
administration of justice."156 
In sum, one of the more striking elements of the Kalven & 
Zeisel Study was evidence of jury deviance from the strict 
application of the law as charged in cases other than the 
"conscience cases." Moreover, the American jury's tendency to 
expand notions of justice beyond the constraints of the applica-
ble law has existed much longer than some observers would 
have us believe. Perhaps it is because Kalven and Zeisel 
believe that "nullification" is properly limited only to certain 
categories of unpopular crimes that they do not recognize that 
jury nullification occurs in each of these other instances as 
well. 157 Nonetheless, their research reveals numerous areas in 
which there is strong reluctance, if not outright refusal, by 
juries to apply the law strictly as instructed, and a willingness 
to reach verdicts of not guilty despite the dictates of evidence 
and law.158 
The question remains, why should these instances of jury 
self-deception continue when a nullification instruction would 
allow jury deliberation to focus on what actually influences its 
decision-the jurors' own concept ofjustice? Thus, whether a 
jury ultimately accepts a victimization defense, or attempts to 
circumvent the constraints of the applicable law, a properly 
devised nullification instruction would allow the jury to exam-
ine honestly and directly whether any of its sentiments are 
"extra-legal" and would allow them consciously to apply or 
reject these sentiments while determining the verdict. 
155. See id. at 296. 
156. Id. at 296-97. 
157. See id. Kalven and Zeise! do assert, however, that acquittals for violations 
of unpopular laws, such as sumptuary laws, are "closest to classic instances of jury 
revolt and nullification." Id. at 433. Additionally, they refer to capital crimes in early 
nineteenth-century England as a "great source of jury nullification." Id. at 311-12 . 
. 158. Kalven and Zeise! also review instances of jury discomfort where there are 
issues of punishment, preferential treatment of one defendant over another, improper 
police methods, and inadvertent conduct. See id. at 236-40, 301-12, 314-17, 324-28. 
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III. THE POSITION AGAINST NULLIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS 
Since Spar{ and Hansen, the debate surrounding the nulli-
fication instruction has centered predominantly around the 
issue of a jury's right to nullify as opposed to its inchoate 
power to do so.159 The dominant judicial view, derived from 
Spar{ and Hansen, is that the jury, through its delivery of a 
general verdict, has the power to disregard the judge's charge 
but is not entitled to do so.16° Consequently, the jury has no 
right to be informed through judicial instruction of its ability 
. to disregard the judge. If a jury nullifies, it must do so purely 
on its own volition. 
On the other hand, those who argue for the right of the jury 
to receive a nullification instruction view that right as deriva-
tive of either the "jury's right to be instructed as to its proper 
function, or from the defendant's right to trial by jury."161 In 
the first instance, the right to a nullification instruction is 
grounded in notions of democratic decision making. 162 Where 
the jury acts· as a representative of the community, the jury 
must decide whether, by "contemporary standards of moral 
blameworthiness, the defendant should be punished for his 
159. See, e.g., Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 157 (1894) (Gray, 
J., dissenting) (stating that juries have the power to nullify and must have the right 
to exercise it because there is no remedy against the exercise of the power); see also 
Scheflin, supra note 8, at 197 (arguing that the inquiry is whether the defendant has 
the right to an instruction on nullification and whether the jury has the right to be 
informed of its nullification power). But see Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the 
American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L. REV. 488, 524 (1976) (argtiing that the 
indefensibility of a right to nullify does not require limits on the jury's power to do 
so); Eleanor Tavris, The Law of an Unwritten Law: A Common Sense View of Jury 
Nullification, 11 W. ST. U. L. REV. 97, 105 (1983) (noting that courts' nullification 
rationales usually concentrate on the issue of the power versus the right of jury 
nullification). 
160. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 
1002 (4th Cir. 1969). 
161. See Scheflin, supra note 8, at 222. 
162. It is worth noting, however, that the issue of whether a judge may or should 
instruct the jury on its power to nullify was not expressly decided by the Court in 
Spar( and Hansen. In fact, by not finding error in the trial court's instruction, 156 
U.S. at 106-07, the Court approved sub rosa a charge that informed the jury of its 
power to nullify while also informing the jury that it would be wrongful to do so, see 
id. at 60 (stating that, although "it may be in the power of the jury" to find the 
defendants guilty of the lesser included crime of manslaughter, if a felonious homocide 
· had been committed, there was no evidence that would reduce the crime to below that 
of murder). 
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actions. "163 Thus, the jury's right to a nullification instruction 
derives from the necessity to inform it of its role in the judicial 
process. 164 
The second rights argument is a defendant-centered ap-
proach, which argues that a criminal defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial includes the possibility of a 
jury acquittal. That is, since the jury has the power to acquit 
against the law and facts, "the defendant cannot be deprived 
of his right to an opportunity for the jury to exercise this 
power."165 Indeed, this argument is related to the first notion 
that the jury's function is greater than mere discernment of the 
facts in a particular case. It recognizes that the jury plays a 
unique role in the judicial process independent from that of 
other government actors. 
Some commentators have evaluated nullification in terms of 
other rights standpoints, including equal protection166 and 
other defendant-centered considerations. 167 In essence, these 
approaches have de-emphasized the instruction itself in favor 
of allowing the jury the evidentiary and procedural freedom to 
consider nullification, whether or not they receive permission 
by way of an explicit instruction. 
The defendant-centered approach attempts to eliminate the 
logical dilemma inherent in the power-versus-right dichotomy, 
that is, the "internal contradiction of protecting the power 
while negating the right. "168 Instead, one commentator proposes 
that nullification be considered in the context of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of a jury trial "not eviscerated by trial 
procedures that cause the jury's verdict to mimic what the 
judge's verdict would have been."169 Under this view, the jury's 
ability to nullify derives from the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right. As opposed to Scheflin's framework, however, this 
approach argues that the defendant's rights are independent 
163. Scheflin, supra note 8, at 197. 
164. Id. at 198. 
165. Id. at 219. 
166. See George C. Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: "Jury Nullifi-
cation» and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1304 (1974) (arguing that 
not all juries are equally aware of the power to nullify and therefore must be expressly 
instructed about their authority). 
167. See Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification and Jury Control 
Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 829 (1990). 
168. Id. at 866. 
169. Id. at 841. 
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of the jury's power to nullify. 170 The jury's ability to nullify is 
"accepted as a necessary side. effect ... to a fully independent 
jury," a jury which is given "unrestricted power of indepen-
dence," free from controls such as directed verdicts, vacated 
acquittals, juror pre-qualification, and certain prosecutorial 
motions in limine. 171 
Judge Weinstein proposes a judge-centered approach, in 
which the locus of power shifts dramatically toward the 
judge.172 Weinstein advocates a system in which nullification 
is permitted, but not fostered, by having judges occasionally 
take a broad view of relevance or admit evidence bearing on 
moral values which might lead to nullification.173 This approach 
turns the others on their heads because it transforms jury 
decision-making independence into a process essentially con-
trolled by the presiding judge. Under this judge-centered 
approach, jury nullification would depend primarily on whether 
the judge, rather than the jury, thinks it appropriate in the 
first instance. There is a logical contradiction in this position. 
If the jury has no inherent right to nullify independently, then 
there can be no collateral right vested in a judge to allow the 
jury to nullify. Indeed, a judge's "permission" to nullify is a 
legal oxymoron. 
As superficially compelling as the power-versus-right debate 
may be, the debate assumes that nullification is a conscious act 
by the jury. The power-versus-right dichotomy fails to address 
the far more frequent phenomenon, in which the jury nullifies 
without understanding that it is doing so, through fictions and 
surrogates.174 Because the dichotomy only considers conscious 
revolt, the analysis of a nullification instruction's possible 
effect is artificially constrained as well. 
The defendant-centered approach makes the power-versus-
right debate irrelevant, but it still does not address the edu-
cational and remedial effect that explicit nullification would 
have on the rest of society. Nullification not only provides the 
criminal defendant with the right to an unfettered jury but also 
lends greater legitimacy to the administration of justice by 
enfranchising those jurors who are relatively distanced from 
170. Id. at 866. 
171. Id. at 866-67. 
172. Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and Should 
a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239 (1993). 
173. Id. at 249-51. 
174. See supra Part II.A 
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power. Nullification, viewed this way, becomes an affirmation 
of the jury as a truly democratic institution. Thus, the signifi-
cance of nullification is not that it embodies some constitution-
al abstraction, such as the right of a suspect to be informed of 
the right against self-incrimination, but rather that it provides 
an inextricable link to the community's awareness of its power 
and its deliberate exercise of that power. 
In contrast, the dominant position in both federal and state 
courts is that a jury should not be informed of its nullification 
power. 175 The literature articulates numerous related but 
discrete arguments against informing the jury of this power.176 
First, critics argue that informing the jury of its nullification 
power is an attack upon the rule of law because it asserts the 
right of individuals, rather than that of society as a whole, to 
determine what lawful conduct should be. 177 Moreover, explicit 
knowledge of this power would loosen any restraints upon the 
jury and lead to anarchy in the courts.178 Underlying this 
position is the concern that a jury's deliberate nullification 
would pose an unwarranted and undemocratic intrusion into 
the legislative arena. By refusing to enforce those laws per-
ceived to be unjust, a jury would usurp the power of the 
democratically elected legislature to determine what conduct 
is unlawful. 179 
A second argument against informing a jury of its power to 
disregard the law is that it may give free rein to the jury's 
extralegal biases. Thus, a nullification instruction could lead 
to acquittals or convictions based on these biases.180 
175. See, e.g., United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1969) ("Sii:J.ce 
the Spar{ case, the lower federal courts-even in the occasional cases in which they 
may have ventured to question its wisdom-have adhered to the doctrine it affirmed 
[that the jury must take the law from the court]. Furthermore, among the states, only 
two still allow the jury to be told that they can disregard the law as given them by 
the court.") (footnotes omitted). 
176. See, e.g., Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: Contours 
of a Controuersy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 85-111 (1980) (summarizing five such 
arguments: (1) it would be anarchy to give the instruction; (2) the instruction is 
unnecessary; (3) the instruction is unwise; (4) the nullification power is necessary but 
better left unsaid; and (5) the instruction would impair the responsibility of the juror). 
177. See United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1972). 
178. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting 
potential "grave dangers" to the current system, which protects against anarchy as 
well as tyranny). 
179. Simson, supra note 159, at 512-13. 
180. See id. at 513-14; see also Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willging, Changing 
Views of Jury Power, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 172-73 (1991) (reporting empirical 
evidence that suggests that when given a nullification charge, juries will occasionally 
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Finally, some argue that informing the jury of its power to 
nullify eliminates the cost placed upon a jury wishing to do so, 
which removes the built-in constraint that limits the nullifica-
tion power only to extraordinary circumstances.181 We review 
these traditional objections to the nullification instruction, with 
particular attention to how they fail to address issues in the 
context of ordinary criminal trials. 
A. Anarchy and Undemocratic Usurpation Arguments 
Perhaps the most common reason articulated in opposition 
to an explicit nullification charge is the belief that the jury's 
knowledge of its prerogative would degrade the rule of law. 
This approach misconstrues the significance of an explicit 
nullification instruction: knowledge of the power to nullify is 
not the power to make or decide whether the law has actually 
been broken, which is a separate and reconcilable function of 
a jury. Rather, the jury's knowledge of its nullification power 
allows it to decide whether the application of the law to the 
particular circumstances of the case before it is just. The jury 
need not violate its oath to take the law as given by the court. 
After deciding that the law has been broken, the jury's function 
should be to determine whether the lawbreaker ought to be 
punished for the behavior as instructed by the court. 
Moreover, the decision whether to enforce particular laws 
does not usurp legislative power. Indeed, this decision is not 
legislative at all. Rather, it is a species of traditional executive 
and judicial discretion.182 Professor Scheflin argues that jury 
nullification is an assessment of whether unlawful conduct 
should be punished and that it therefore checks prosecutorial 
indiscretion.183 According to Scheflin, prosecutorial discretion 
filters out many marginal cases, and jury nullification weeds 
out the rest. 184 Yet Scheflin and others, such as Professor Jon 
be more severe with "unsympatheticn defendants than the law mandates). 
181. E.g., MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 35, 
59-66 (1973); see also Weinstein, supra note 172, at 250-51 (opining that the absence 
of the instruction ensures that nullification will occur only in "relatively infrequent 
extreme casesn). 
182. Scheflin, supra note 8, at 181. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
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Van Dyke, confine their analysis to political trials. According 
to their analysis, in ordinary criminal trials, prosecutorial 
discretion reflects community attitudes; in political trials, 
where the government is the purported victim, the jury must 
exercise the discretion normally residing in the prosecutor. 185 
Scheflin and Van Dyke do not consider the potential effect 
on verdicts of our multiracial, multicultural, and economically 
stratified society, in which many groups either are or perceive 
themselves to be excluded from positions which traditionally 
have exercised discretion-the police, the prosecution, and the 
judiciary. In particular, Scheflin and Van Dyke's conclusion 
does not address the fact that the racial make-up of those 
administeringjustice and that of defendants and jury greatly 
diverge. For example, the Report of the New York State 
Judicial Commission on Minorities concluded that "inequality, 
disparate treatment and·injustice remain hallmarks of [New 
York State's] justice system" and that "courts ... have lost the 
confidence of the poor."186 Scheflin and Van Dyke's premise 
that official discretion in ordinary criminal trials reflects 
community sentiment is therefore dubious. If community 
sentiment differs from prosecutorial practice, then it is proper 
for the community, through the jury, to provide a check on 
prosecutorial judgment in ordinary criminal matters as well. 
A jury's decision to allow a lawbreaker to go free does not 
compromise the integrity of the rule oflaw any more than the 
decision of an individual police officer or prosecutor not to 
arrest or prosecute a lawbreaker prior to trial. 187 
Professor Simson argues that informing a jury of its 
nullification power would be an undemocratic usurpation of 
185. See id. at 191 ("[l]n ordinary criminal trials, prosecutorial discretion tempers 
harsh ... laws and forbears from instigating criminal violations not founded upon 
community support .... [whereas in political trials] prosecutorial discretion no longer 
acts as a buffer between the community and the law ... "); cf Jon M. Van Dyke, The 
Jury As a Political Institution, 16 CATH. LAW. 224, 238 (1970) (arguing that juries in 
ordinary criminal trials will not be tempted to exercise nullification powers because 
the jurors are victims of crimes of violence rather than crimes of conscience). 
186. 1 REPoRT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL CoMMISSION ON MINORITIES 1 (1991) 
[hereinafter N.Y. REPORT]. 
187. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 1 (1975) [hereinafter POLICE 
DISCRETION] (noting that the individual patrol officer decides daily "what law to enforce, 
how much to enforce it, against whom, and on what occasions"); see also KENNETH C. 
DA VIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188 (1969) [hereinafter DISCRETION-
ARY JUSTICE] (noting that the discretionary power in the criminal justice system that 
trumps all others is the power to decide whether to prosecute). 
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legislative power.188 According to Professor Simson, nullifica-
tion "frustrate[s] the people's sense of justice" since the 
legislature, not the jury, reflects the majoritarian view.189 
Nullification essentially attacks democratic principles by com-
promising, among other things, the dispensation of equal 
justice, the need for legislative reform, and the executive's 
ability to implement policies on a wide scale. 190 
The Ninth Circuit expressed similar views in United States 
v. Simpson. 191 In Simpson, the defendant had set fire to Se-
lective Service files to protest the United States' involvement 
in Southeast Asia. 192 As in many of the war resister cases, the 
defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court had 
refused to inform the jury of its power to acquit regardless of 
the evidence of the defendant's guilt. 193 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the conviction, reasoning that such an instruction 
would strike "to the heart of our society" because what was 
being proposed was "not merely that jurors should be given the 
power to determine what is the law, but that they should be 
instructed that they may acquit a defendant even though they 
believe that he did something the law forbids. "194 The Simpson 
court suggested that if a nullification instruction were given, 
"we ·would have a kind of anarchy; that is, a system in which 
the ultimate test of socially permissible conduct is, to a signifi-
cant degree, the random reaction of a group of twelve people 
selected at random. "195 
Both Professor Simson and the Simpson court conflate the 
notions of a general proscription and its enforcement. Nullifi-
cation is not any single jury's attempt to veto the majority's 
notions of impermissible conduct as expressed through the 
legislature. It is simply one jury's decision that under the 
particular circumstances before it, conduct that may otherwise 
be generally impermissible should not be subject to sanction. 
Professors Scheflin and Van Dyke refer to this authority as the 
"dispensing_ power" of the jury, the "power of conscience which 
permits the jury to suspend the application of a particular law 
188. See Simson, supra note 159, at 512-16. 
189. Id. at 512. 
190. See id. at 513-16. 
191. 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972). 
192. Id. at 516. 
193. Id. at 517. 
194. Id. at 519 (citation omitted). 
195. Id. at 520 n.12. 
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in a particular instance to a particular defendant in the 
interest of conscience and justice. "196 
This is precisely the discretionary power already given to 
unelected police officers and prosecutors.197 Professors Scheflin 
and Van Dyke argue that the police have the discretion not to 
arrest; that the prosecutors have the discretion whether or not 
to bring criminal charges; and that the trial judges have the 
discretion whether or not to allow cases to proceed to trial. 198 
Thus, in many instances these actors may act to "temper the 
rigor of the law" despite a technical violation of that law.199 In 
fact, by appropriating only one-half to two-thirds of the funds 
and personnel necessary to achieve full enforcement, legisla-
tures have acquiesced to the discretionary enforcement of 
statutes by the government. 200 
The full contour of the nullification debate can best be seen 
in United States v. Dougherty.201 In Dougherty, the defendants 
appealed convictions for destroying Dow Chemical Company 
property. At trial, the defendants contended that they de-
stroyed the property to protest the Vietnam War and Dow's 
support of United States military efforts.202 On appeal, they 
argued that the trial judge improperly refused to instruct the 
jury of its right to acquit the defendants without regard to the 
law and further refused to allow the defendants to argue this 
issue to the jury.203 
In affirming the trial court, Judge Leventhal stated that "the 
simultaneous achievement of modest jury equity and avoidance 
ofintolerable caprice depends upon formal instructions that do 
not expressly delineate a jury charter to carve out its own rules 
196. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 176, at 87 (arguing that this dispensing 
power is not the power to make, redefine, supplant, or overrule the law). 
197. See DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 187, at 190 ("The prosecutor has more 
control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.") (quoting 
Justice Robert H. Jackson, Federal Trial Rules Simulate State Reform, 24 J. AM. Jun. 
Soc. 18, 18-19 (1940)); Weinstein, supra note 172, at 246-47 ("By far the greatest 
nullification takes place as a result of decisions not to prosecute or reduce charges .... 
(P]rosecutors have enormous discretion because of the great number of crimes found 
in our over-expansive criminal laws."). 
198. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 176, at 87. 
199. Id. 
200. POLICE DISCRETION, supra note 187, at 80-81; see also Scheflin & Van Dyke, 
supra note 176, at 112 (arguing that the generality of the laws written by legislatures 
necessitates the exercise of prosecutorial discretion). 
201. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
202. See id. at 1120. 
203. Id. at 1117. 
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of law."204 According to Judge Leventhal, to notify the juror of 
the nullification power, "is to inform him, in effect, that it is 
he who fashions the rule that condemns."205 Thus, an explicit 
nullification instruction "conveys an implied approval that runs 
the risk of degrading the legal structure requisite for true 
freedom, for an ordered liberty that protects against anarchy 
as well as tyranny."206 
In his. dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon sought to 
correct the majority's characterization of jury nullification by 
emphasizing that it is the legislature's function 
to define and proscribe certain behavior that is generally 
considered blameworthy .... [However,] [t]he drafters of 
legal rules cannot anticipate and take account of every case 
where a defendant's conduct is "unlawful" but not blame-
worthy, any more than they can draw a bold line to mark 
the boundary between an accident and negligence. It is the 
jury-as spokesman for the community's sense of val-
ues.,...-that must explore that subtle and elusive boundary.207 
Judge Bazelon's dissent suggests the importance of the 
nullification instruction to ensure community input in enforc-
ing the law. This species of jury discretion may have positive 
societal as well as legal value. Many communities perceive that 
the legal system dispenses justice inequitably, and this percep-
tion is grounded in a disgraceful reality. For example, the 
Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minori-
ties found that "a general public perception of bias" in the New 
York state courts exists because "[v]estiges of long-standing 
discrimination" against people of color "pervade their ... per-
ceptions of their ability to achieve justice."208 Furthermore, as 
of 1991, out of a total of 1129 New York state judges, only 93 
are members of minority groups.209 Moreover, the Commission 
found that, in 1989, whites comprised eighty-two percent of 
New York court's nonjudicial employees210 and that minorities 
204. Id. at 1134. 
205. Id. at 1136. 
206. Id. at 1137. 
207. Id. at 1140 & n.5, 1142 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). 
208. 1 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 186, at 27. 
209. Id. at 94. Seventy-one African Americans, 19 Latinos, and 3 Asian Americans 
comprised the 8.2% of judges who were minorities. Id. 
210. Id. at 116. 
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were underrepresented as attorneys, court officers, junior court 
analysts, court reporters, and court clerks.211 Statistics like 
these have led Franklin H. Williams, Chairperson of the 
Commission on Minorities, to conclude that "there is more here 
than just the perception of a biased court system. There is in 
New York State in the 1990's the reality of a biased court 
system."212 
According to the New York Law Journal, in 1994, of 1167 
trial and appellate judges in New York, only 125 were minor-
ities.213 This figure indicates that even with an apparent effort 
over the last three years to increase minority representation 
on the bench, the gap between whites and minorities remains 
substantial. Indeed, while the majority of the population of 
Brooklyn and Queens are people of color, the same is true of 
less than twenty percent of the judges in each borough. 214 
Thus, the community's lack of knowledge that it has the 
authority to check inequitable law enforcement and prosecu-
torial discretion through nullification is more than an academic 
problem. 215 This ignorance may reinforce the community's sense 
of powerlessness and erode its respect for the law and the 
criminal justice system.216 The law will ultimately be strength-
ened, not weakened, by acknowledging the check on police and 
prosecutorial discretion given to the jury as a representative 
body, because society thus gains community oversight of the 
conduct of governmental officials. 
211. Id. at 105. 
212. Id. at vii. 
213. Today's News, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 3, 1994, at 1 (discussing a report by the Associa-
tion of Hispanic Judges and the Judicial Friends which places this figure at 11 %). 
214. Id.; see also David Johnston, Bias Found in Choosing of Justices, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 6, 1994, at Bl, B4 (reporting that as of July 1994, 90% of the appointed judges 
on the bench in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx were white and that 73% of the 
elected judges sitting on the New York Supreme Court in these boroughs were white). 
215. Cf Scheflin, supra note 8, at 190 ("[P)articipation on the jury gives the people 
a feeling of greater involvement in their government which further legitimizes that 
government."). 
216. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 176, at 103 (noting that a nullification 
instruction "would give the jurors a sense of responsibility, respect, and influence over 
the law that regulates their lives"). Scheflin and Van Dyke assert, however, that in 
the ordinary criminal case nullification is unlikely because "people [like themselves) 
are victims of these crimes." Id. While we agree that juries are less likely to nullify 
when violent crimes have been committed against other members of the community, 
we nevertheless believe that, as the racial makeup of criminal defendants has become 
overwhelmingly different from that of the majority of the police, prosecution, and 
judiciary, the minority community's trust in the justice system has waned but that 
it may be reinforced with increased input from the community. 
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A recent New York Times I WCBS News poll found that, out 
of all city residents polled, minority group residents most 
strongly expressed skepticism about the New York City Police 
Department.217 The poll found that a majority of African 
American and Latino respondents, as well as a "sizable minor-
ity" of white respondents, believed that the New York City police 
were generally tougher on people of color.218 This criticism is 
not without a rational basis. For example, in New York City, 
a city in which over fifty-three percent of the population is 
either African American or Latino, members of both groups 
account for only twenty-five percent of the police force. 219 
Moreover, ninety-three percent of the sergeants are white, and, 
as of April 1994, not a single African American had attained 
the rank of captain.220 There are similar disparities in other 
cities where the non-Caucasian population is in the majority, 
including Chicago,221 Los Angeles,222 and Houston.223 Detroit is 
the only major city in which a majority of police officers are 
people of color, although the discrepancy remains substantial 
between their representation on the police force and their share 
of the population. 224 
As a popular check on executive and judicial discretion, the 
nullification instruction would inject more democracy into the 
justice system, rather than usurp its influence, and would 
serve as a direct reminder from the bench that one of the 
purposes of the jury is to reflect community values. A nullifi-
cation instruction would reemphasize to the jury, and to the 
actors in the entire criminal justice system, why we do not 
employ professional fact finders in criminal cases and why we 
have a constitutional right to a trial by jury. Perhaps most 
importantly, a carefully crafted nullification instruction would 
allow the community to exercise its role as overseer consciously 
and deliberately, rather than through fictions and surrogates. 
It would create the incentive to deliberate openly about the 
merits of the evidence and would remove the inclination to 
217. Clifford Krauss, Poll Finds a Lack of Faith in Police, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 
1994, at Al, B30. 
218. Id. at B30. 
219. Peter T. Kilborn, New York Police Force Lagging in Recruitment of Black 
Officers, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994, at 1, 26. 
220. Id. at 1. 
221. Approximately 56% of the population and 32% of the police force. Id. at 26. 
222. Approximately 54% of the population and 37% of the police force. Id. 
223. Approximately 56% of the population and 27% of the police force. Id. 
224. Approximately 78% of the population and 59% of the police force. Id. 
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disguise nullification sentiment as fact finding. As a result, the 
instruction would enable jurors to focus on the evidence 
without hindering their ability to question frankly and freely 
the propriety of the prosecution. 
B. Bias-determined Outcomes 
Another frequently expressed objection to a nullification 
instruction is that it would give freer rein to juror biases, 
thereby producing convictions or acquittals based upon im-
proper prejudice.225 This position ignores procedural protections 
against convictions not supported by the evidence, such as the 
defendant's right to appeal and the trial court's power to vacate 
convictions. 
The position is also illogical. To illustrate, in Dougherty, 
Judge Bazelon responded to the argument that "the sponta-
neous and unsolicited act of nullification" will more likely 
reflect bias than lack of instruction as follows: 
It seems substantially more plausible to me to assume that 
the very opposite is true. The juror motivated by prejudice 
seems to me more likely to make spontaneous use of the 
power to nullify, and more likely to disregard the judge's 
exposition of the normally controlling legal standards. The 
conscientious juror, who could make a careful effort to 
consider the blameworthiness of the defendant's action in 
light of prevailing community values, is the one most likely 
to obey the judge's admonition that the jury enforce strict 
principles of law. 226 
Thus, a carefully crafted nullification instruction, one that 
informs the jury of its discretion to find guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and yet to acquit on the basis that justice is 
better served by not convicting the offender, would actually 
offer protection against bias. 227 
225. Cf Simson, supra note 159, at 514 ("[Bly activating local biases, jury nullifica-
tion may at times in effect immunize criminal acts visited upon members of society's 
'discrete and insular minorities.'"). 
226. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, 
C.J., dissenting). 
227. According to Judge Bazelon: 
[I)t is hard . . . to see how a nullification instruction could enhance the 
likelihood of [an unjust conviction) .... The instruction would speak in terms of 
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Finally, while some abuses inevitably do occur in the jury 
room, to the extent that jurors represent a fair cross-section of 
the community, the likelihood that a particular bias will 
improperly influence the jury to convict or acquit will de-
crease. 228 Scheflin notes that the spectre that white juries 
would convict black defendants and acquit white defendants 
solely out of racial prejudice lessens as the presence of disen-
franchised groups in the administration of justice increases.229 
Thus, the solution to bias in the jury system is not avoidance 
of a nullification instruction but education of and greater 
participation by the entire community.230 
A properly crafted nullification instruction would create a 
better environment in which to expose and confront social 
biases during deliberation. At present, the availability of 
surrogates for the jury's own concepts of justice provides cover 
acquittal, not conviction, and it would provide no comfort to a juror determined 
to convict a defendant in defiance of the law or the facts of the case. Indeed, 
unless the jurors ignored the nullification instruction they could not convict on 
the grounds of prejudice alone. Does the judge's recitation of the instruction 
increase the likelihood that the jury will ignore the limitation that lies at its 
heart? I hardly think so. 
As for the problem of unjust acquittal, ... [w]here defendants seem dangerous, 
juries are unlikely to exercise their nullification power, whether or not an explicit 
instruction is offered. Of course, that check will not prevent the acquittal of a 
defendant who may be blameworthy and dangerous except in the jaundiced eyes 
of a jury motivated by a perverse and sectarian sense of values. But whether a 
nullification instruction would make such acquittals more common is problemati-
cal, if not entirely inconceivable. In any case, the real problem in this situation 
is not the nullification doctrine, but the values and prejudice that prompt the 
acquittal. And the solution is not to condemn the nullification power, but to 
spotlight the prejudice and parochial values that underlie the verdict in the hope 
that the public outcry will force re-examination of those values, and deter their 
implementation in subsequent cases. 
Id. at 1143 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
228. The issue of whether juries fairly represent a cross-section of most commu-
nities is an important issue but is beyond the scope of this Article. For discussion on 
the underrepresentation of minority jurors, see 1 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 186, at 
53-59 (reporting that African-American and other minority communities are either 
not welcome or actually excluded from New York state jury pools); Deborah A. 
Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury 
Service, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 761 (concluding that Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 
(1991), which upheld the exclusion of bilingual Latinos on the basis that these jurors 
would not adhere solely to the official English translation of Spanish testimony, could 
potentially exclude all bilingual Latino jurors in cases where Spanish testimony could 
be brought before the court); Joseph P. Fried, Bias Charged in Selection of U.S. Juries, 
N.Y. Times, June 2, 1994, at Bl, B2 (discussing the controversy surrounding the 
Eastern District of New York's practice of using predominately white, Long Island 
juror pools for cases tried in Brooklyn, while using only Long Island-based jurors for 
cases tried on Long Island). 
229. Scheflin, supra note 8, at 212. 
230. Id. 
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for juror biases. A nullification instruction would offer less 
incentive to conceal prejudices or to exercise prejudice by 
raising false collateral issues. 
C. Nullification Power Only in 
Extraordinary Circumstances 
A third objection to informing a jury of its nullification 
power posits that "nullification which arises out of ignorance 
is in some sense more worthy than nullification which arises 
out of knowledge."231 That is, the jury has a "recourse role," 
the authority to reevaluate and go beyond procedural con-
straints when these constraints are perceived to conflict with 
goals.232 The difference between a recourse role and unfettered 
discretion, however, is that the former imposes a cost upon the 
body wishing to redefine its constraints. By not informing the 
jury of its nullification power, the cost limits the exercise of 
the power to extraordinary circumstances, which reflects the 
proper application of the nullification power.233 
The difficulty with this position, asserted by Professors 
Mortimer and Sanford Kadish, is that it assumes that the 
proper limits on the exercise of the nullification power are 
dictated by the jury's ignorance. Meanwhile, there is reason to 
believe that a conscious decision on the part of a jury to 
231. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1141 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); see also KADISH & 
KADISH, supra note 181, at 59-66. 
232. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 176, at 99 (defining "recourse role" as "the 
authority to reexamine the constraints .... when those constraints appear to conflict 
with the goals they were set up to further"); see also KADISH & KADISH, supra note 
181, at 65 (positing that "an explicit statement that the jury may invoke their own 
values ... would ... invite jury nullification on a greater scale"). 
233. Id. at 64-65; cf. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1136-37. In Dougherty, the court 
suggested that 
it is pragmatically useful to structure instructions in such wise [sic] that the 
jury must feel strongly about the values involved in the case, so strongly that 
it must itself identify the case as establishing a call of high conscience .... 
[This] confines the happening of the lawless jury to the occasional instance that 
does not violate, and viewed as an exception may even enhance, the over-all 
normative effect of the rule of law. 
Id. at 1136-37 (footnote omitted). See also KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 498 
("Perhaps one reason why the jury exercises its very real power so sparingly is be-
cause it is officially told it has none."). 
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exercise its nullification power, guided by appropriate instruc-
tions, would not impose a cost and may even confer a bene-
fit. 234 Moreover, this position evidences a basic mistrust of the 
way jurors approach their task, of their collective common 
sense and moral judgment, and consequently, of the jury 
system itself.235 Indeed, by creating an atmosphere where 
juries deliberate fully and carefully about whether any issue 
other than a defendant's legal guilt should be considered, 
jurors might be less inclined to succumb to bias because such 
bias would be met by prosecutorial counterargument and the 
critical response of the other members of the jury.· 
The empirical evidence supports our hypothesis. In experi-
mental studies conducted by Professor Irwin Horowitz, mock 
juries were given explicit nullification instructions and stan-
dard nonnullification'instructions. 236 Professor Horowitz found 
that prosecutorial challenges made to nullification arguments 
counterbalanced and sufficiently curbed juror bias.237 Thus, a 
nullification instruction that imposes procedural constraints 
on the power to nullify and allows substantive challenges to its 
234. See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1141-43 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (placing trust 
in the jury not to abuse their power upon receipt of a nullification instruction). 
235. Cf id. at 1142. 
236. Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instruction on Verdicts and 
Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 30-32 (1985). The 
Horowitz juries deliberated three different scenarios: felony murder, vehicular 
homicide involving drunk driving, and euthanasia. Different juries were given 
different instructions: a standard nonnullification instruction, a Maryland instruction 
containing a nullification charge, or a "Radical Nullification Instruction," in which 
jurors were told that they had the power to decide whether to apply a given law, that 
it was appropriate to bring their conscience and that of the community into the 
deliberations, and that nothing would bar an acquittal if the jury felt that a conviction 
would produce inequitable or unjust results. Id. Horowitz found that the acquittal 
rates for juries given the standard nonnullification instruction or the Maryland 
instruction did not differ substantially. Id. at 32-34. In fact, there is no evidence that 
Maryland has greater or fewer instances of nullification than any other state. Id. 
However, Horowitz later concluded that when juries were given the Radical Nullifica-
tion Instruction they were more likely to acquit a sympathetic defendant, judge a 
dangerous defendant more harshly, and spend less time on the evidence and more on 
defendant characteristics. See Horowitz, infra note 237, at 451-52. This result does 
not mean receipt of a nullification instruction liberates the jury from the constraints 
of instructions per se. Indeed, given the wording of the Radical Nullification Instruc-
tion, an argument could be made that the mock juries were diligently following the 
instructions given. For a discussion of the various instructions used in the Horowitz 
studies, see infra notes 273-75 and accompanying text. 
237. Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, 
Arguments and ChallengesonJuryDecisionMaking, 12 LAW &HUM. BEHAV. 439, 451 
(1988) ("The impact of challenges to nullification arguments depressed juries' 
tendencies to act upon their sentiments."). 
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application would levy the kind of cost that the Kadishes 
believe is required for the proper exercise of nullification. An 
instruction which informs the jury of its nullification power, 
but at the same time conveys the expectation that the jury 
must follow the law to reach its verdict, would likely minimize 
the number of nullifications.238 
A nullification instruction that commands the jury to con-
sider the evidence and decide the guilt of the defendant before 
considering issues of justice would both inform the jury of the 
parameters of deliberation and impose constraints upon the 
their discretion to nullify. One commentator has suggested that 
a nullification instruction is "like telling children not to put 
beans in their noses. Most of them would not have thought of 
it had it not been suggested."239 But, just as many parents will 
attest that there need be no prompting for children to push 
small objects into their nostrils and ears, so too do recent 
events and anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that 
juries do think about and act upon their nullification impulses 
more than has been traditionally acknowledged.240 We do not 
leave the dispensation of justice to children. Moreover, we 
leave it to juries composed of concerned and intelligent adults 
who are sensitive to the need for justice. 
IV. ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE NULLIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS 
There have been various attempts to introduce a nulllfication 
instruction to the modernjury process, both in actual cases and 
under simulated conditions.241 Two states, Maryland and Indi-
ana, currently permit nullification instructions. 242 These states 
have been viewed as laboratories, allowing scholars to study 
238. See Stephen R. Mysliwiec, Note, Toward Principles of Jury Equity, 83 YALE 
L.J. 1023, 1051-52 (1974); see also Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1141 (Bazelon, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the conscientious juror who will carefully consider the 
blameworthiness of the defendant is the one most likely to obey the judge's admonition 
to enforce the law). 
239. Weinstein, supra note 172, at 250. 
240. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) ("Surely nothing is gained by the pretense that the jurors 
lack the power to nullify, since that pretense deprives them of the opportunity to hear 
the very instruction that might compel them to confront their responsibility."). 
241. See infra Part IV.A-B. ' 
242. See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. 
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the actual effect of nullification instructions on the outcome of 
real cases. 243 However, given a number of factors, most impor-
tantly the wording of the nullification instruction, such studies 
are not particularly instructive in understanding the actual 
effects of an instruction on a deliberating jury. Notwithstand-
ing the nullification language in the charges, we are not 
convinced that Maryland and Indiana juries have been provid-
ed with the clear opportunity to nullify which comes from a 
real understanding of the power to nullify.244 
A number of other states had bills pending in their legisla-
tures which would permit nullification instructions.245 Some of 
the language proposed in these bills differs markedly from that 
currently employed in Maryland and Indiana. Until these bills 
are enacted,246 however, there will be no empirical evidence by 
which to determine the effects of these instructions either. 
It is helpful at this point to restate that the fundamental 
purposes of a nullification instruction are to inform a jury of 
its power to acquit a defendant notwithstanding a clear factual 
finding of guilt and to inform the jury of its power to import 
243. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 176, at 80-85 (analyzing jury nullifi-
cation in the Maryland and Indiana courts); cf. Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Right to 
Disagree: Judges, Juries, and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Maryland, 
1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 571, 577-79 (noting counsel's role in providing interpretations 
of law to Maryland juries); M. Kristine Creagan, Note, Jury Nullification: Assessing 
Recent Legislative Developments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101, 1130-36 (1993) 
(discussing the practical effects of nullification instructions on trial outcomes in 
Maryland and Indiana). 
244. See Horowitz, supra note 236, at 29 ("Proponents of the nullification doctrine 
feel that the Maryland instruction is too vaguely worded to have a substantial 
impact.n). 
245. See, e.g., H.B. 5248, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1995) ("[I]f a juror finds 
the law to be unjust or wrongly applied to the defendant such juror may exercise the 
traditional right of jurors to vote according to conscience regardless of the facts of the 
case ... . n); S. 4157, 218th Gen. Assembly, let Reg. Sees. (N.Y. 1995) ("Upon request 
of a defendant, the court must also state that the jury has the final authority to decide 
whether or not to apply the law to the facts before it, that it is appropriate to bring 
into its deliberations the feelings of the community and its own feelings based on con-
science, and that nothing would bar the jury from acquitting the defendant if it feels 
that the law, as applied to the facts, would produce an inequitable or unjust result.n); 
H.B. 296, 54th Legis. Sess. (Mont. 1995) (defining the right to ajury trial as including 
the right to inform the jury of its power to judge both law and facts as well as to vote 
according to conscience); cf H.B. 2514, 74th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995) (creating a right 
in the defendant to inform the jury ofits nullification power, explicitly forbidding the 
court or the State to infringe on that right, and providing that the failure to allow the 
defendant to exercise this right is grounds for mistrial). 
246. As of the time of this Article's publication, none of the bills cited, supra note 
245, have been enacted. The Connecticut bill was rejected in committee. The Montana 
bill had passed the house committee but failed to pass on the floor. The New York and 
Texas bills are still awaiting action. 
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its own concept of justice into its deliberation. A nullification 
instruction must serve the purposes both of jury empowerment 
and of a rational, deliberative process. The proposed instruc-
tions from the literature and the courts fall short of the second 
purpose; while they inform the jury of its power to nullify, they 
do not provide the jury with any guidance to nullify in a 
rational way. 
A. The Maryland Charge and Empirical Studies 
The Constitution of Maryland states that, "[i]n the trial of 
all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well 
as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain a conviction."247 In Maryland, the 
typical jury instruction regarding the jury's proper role reads 
as follows: 
Members of the Jury, this is a criminal case and under the 
Constitution and the laws of the State of Maryland in a 
criminal case the jury are the judges of the law as well as 
of the facts in the case. So that whatever I tell you about 
the law while it is intended to be helpful to you in reaching 
a just and proper verdict in the case, it is not binding upon 
you as members of the jury and you may accept or reject 
it. And you may apply the law as you apprehend it to be in 
the case. 248 
The empirical studies of jury nullification in the Maryland 
courts have been inconclusive as to the effect of such an 
instruction. 249 There has been no showing that such an instruc-
247. MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 23 (amended 1992). Similarly, the 
Indiana state constitution provides: "In all criminal cases .. : the jury shall have the 
right to determine the law and the facts." IND. CONST. art. I,§ 19. As previously noted, 
a number of other states have recently considered legislation which would similarly 
grant the jury the power and the right to pass upon the law as well as the facts. See 
legislative bills cited supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
248. See Wyleyv. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 372 F.2d 742, 743 n.1 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 863 (1967). 
249. See Jacobsohn, supra note 243, at582-600 (finding that 47. 7% of polled judges 
believe that the nullification instruction has no observable impact on Maryland 
verdicts). Jacobsohn's methodology relied exclusively on judges as reporters; it did not 
factor in other constraints on the trial process such as jury control mechanisms and 
evidentiary rulings. See id. at 583. Without factoring in other means by which the 
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tion has resulted in substantial disruption in the administra-
tion ofjustice.250 Specifically, studies have shown that judicial 
disagreement with jury verdicts is only marginally greater in 
Maryland than it is nationwide.251 
Unfortunately, and perhaps inevitably, the greatest difficulty 
in evaluating the empirical effects of such an instruction 
involves the sample of trials selected. This is not merely an 
issue of methodology, which is itself highly problematic,252 but 
one of the overall effects that a legitimized jury nullification 
will have on a state's criminal justice system, jury control 
practices, and legal culture.253 For example, if certain cases 
court controlled the trial process, we cannot know whether the failure of a given jury 
to nullify was due to (1) a direct rejection of nullification on the merits, (2) a failure 
of the jury to appreciate the nullification power contained in the Maryland instruc-
tions, or (3) a trial that by judicial rulings, evidentiary and otherwise, was cleansed 
of all facts and arguments that might incline a jury to nullify. 
250. Id. at 589. 
251. Id. at 585; see also Samuel K. Dennis, Maryland's Antique Constitutional 
Thorn, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 34, 39 (1943) (explaining that Maryland criminal trials 
proceed with "fair success and justice" due to the excellence of Maryland jurors and 
the narrow scope of their duties). 
252. Although the statistical results of these studies use relatively neutral char-
acterizations, such as "juror agreement" or "juror disagreement" with the judge, these 
studies are based upon the assumption that the judge is a reliable reporter. See, e.g., 
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 50-54. However, a subsequent study by Baldwin 
and McConville has questioned that assumption. John Baldwin & Michael Mcconville, 
Trial by Jury: Some Empirical Evidence on Contested Criminal Cases in England, 13 
LAW & Soc. REV. 861 (1979). In this study, all trial participants, including judges, 
defense lawyers, the prosecution, and police witnesses, evaluated the trials in which 
they had participated. The results in each case varied widely from reporter to reporter. 
See id. at 865-71. Sociologist Martha Myers, relying largely on interviews with actual 
jurors, has shed additional light on the reasons for jurors' "rule departures." See 
generally Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their 
Verdicts, 13 LAW & Soc. REV. 781 (1979) (finding that rule departures reflect not only 
a concern about the defendant's behavior but also about the choices of the victim and 
the seriousness of the prosecution's charge). 
The most tendentious part of most experimental jury studies is the use of the mini-
trial. By subjecting the mock jury to a proceeding no more than a few hours in length, 
as opposed to a trial which can last anywhere from a few days to many months, and 
because of the inevitable influence that editing choices and camera work have on the 
viewer, certain highlighted "events" tend to loom larger in the jurors' minds. Stretched 
memories, boredom, the sheer volume of information, and the tendency of a real jury 
to view the courtroom experience through a wider lens go untested in simulated 
studies. Because of the miniaturization of the trial experience, certain tested events 
tend to exert a greater effect on the overall outcome than might otherwise be the case. 
Additionally, simulatedjuryfindings may not necessarily be generalized to complex 
situations in which numerous variables affect jurors and the verdicts actually affect 
a defendant's life. See V. Lee Hamilton, Obedience and Responsibility: A Jury 
Simulation, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 126, 128-30 (1978); Myers, supra, at 
794-95. 
253. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY, 349-73 (1987) 
(discussing how judges, prosecutors, and police may ameliorate the potentially unjust 
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involving classes of crimes, such as sumptuary crimes, de 
minimis violations, and petty offenses, are viewed by the police 
as more likely to result in nullification acquittals, then the 
police might exercise more discretion in effectuating or booking 
arrests in these cases.254 A similar calculation by a prosecutor 
may result in a dismissal of the charges or a "low-ball" plea 
bargain to resolve the case at an early stage rather than to risk 
a nullification acquittal. Similarly,judges may not wish to clog 
their trial calendars with cases more likely to result in acquit-
tals; they in turn, will pressure prosecutors either to dismiss 
the charges or to accept pleas to lesser offenses. Subject to 
statutory and state constitutional constraints, judges may 
dismiss cases "in furtherance of justice" over the prosecutor's 
objection.255 The factors that the court considers in evaluating 
application oflaw); JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW & SocIETY 80-92 (2d ed. 1952) (discussing 
the development of common law offenses into statutory offenses); William W. Fisher 
III, Ideology, Religion and Constitutional Protection of Private Property, 39 EMORY L.J. 
65, 121-31 (1990) (celebrating nullification of the fugitive slave laws by judges 
through sentencing, directed verdicts, and evidentiary findings); Scheflin, supra note 
8, at 181 (discussing amelioration through reduction of charges, declining to prosecute, 
and dismissing cases); Weinstein, supra, note 172, at 246 (noting police discretion in 
declining to arrest assailants in domestic abuse cases). However, none of these sources 
has explored the possible effect that a nullification instruction would have on the 
exercise of discretion by the other participants, namely jurors, in the criminal justice 
system. 
254. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 140.20(4) (McKinney 1992) (requiring the 
release of a suspect from custody based on a lack of reasonable cause to detain at any 
time prior to bringing the suspect before the· court). 
255. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 210.40(1) (McKinney 1993) (permitting as 
a matter of judicial discretion the dismissal of an indictment "in the furtherance of 
justice" because of the existence of a "compelling factor, consideration or circum-
stance"); see also People v. Clayton, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (creating 
a "Clayton Dismissal" which allows dismissal of charges in response to a defendant's 
motion pursuant to § 210.40(1)). The Clayton court listed a number of issues which 
should be considered when determining the "interests of justice" in a particular case. 
Id. at 110; After Clayton, § 210.40(1) was amended to list explicitly factors which a 
court should consider in reviewing a motion brought under§ 210.40(1). These factors 
are: 
(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; 
(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense; 
(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial; 
(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant; 
(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel 
in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant; 
(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence 
authorized for the offense; 
(g) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the 
criminal justice system; 
(h) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community; 
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when to dismiss in the furtherance of justice fit the prosecuto-
rial and judge-driven amelioration and nullification models 
quite closely. In each of these circumstances, however, cases 
that would otherwise go to trial and be subject to a nullifica-
tion charge never go before the jury. Thus, whatever lessons 
we might learn from the verdicts of the nullification cases that 
ultimately go to trial and are acquitted are difficult to surmise. 
Just as significantly, in cases where judges find no issue of 
justice or judicial economy that would warrant dismissal or a 
reduction of the charges, jury control mechanisms and evi-
dentiary rulings during trial often will minimize the effect of 
a nullification charge.256 Judicial discretion thus may work to 
keep away from the jury the sorts of facts and arguments that 
might otherwise incline jurors to nullify. Under such circum-
stances, the nullification instruction may be of no real benefit 
to the defendant or to the deliberation process. In such cases, 
we cannot know what effect the nullification instruction could 
have had. 
Lastly, petty offenses, de minimis violations, and sumptuary 
crimes are often misdemeanors which carry a maximum 
sentence of less than six months. 257 Charged with such a 
misdemeanor, a criminal defendant has no right guaranteed 
by the Federal Constitution to a jury trial,258 and many states 
do not provide statutory or constitutional guarantees of a jury 
(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant 
or victim with respect to the motion; 
(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction 
would serve no useful purpose. 
Id. § 210.40(1)(a}-(j). 
256. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 403 (designating the judge as the sole arbiter of 
"relevant evidence," defined as evidence "having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence"). In determining admissibility, 
relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence." Id. Surely, the judge's power to limit the admission of evidence under 
Rule 403 can serve to exclude facts that, while relevant to a nullification argument, 
might "confuse the issues" or "mislead the jury. n 
257. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(4) (McKinney 1987) (defining the term 
"misdemeanor"). 
258. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), noted in Baldwin v. New 
York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (holding that offenses punishable by a maximum of six 
months incarceration are "petty" and thus do not fall within the ambit of the Sixth 
Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial for serious offenses). 
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trial for such crimes.259 Thus, many types of crimes which 
would warrant nullification260 are tried before the bench and 
not before juries. 
These practices do not discount in any way the indirect 
effects that a standard nullification instruction might have on 
the exercise oflaw enforcement and prosecutorial andjudicial 
discretion even in cases that will never go to trial. The feed-
back that a nullification instruction would provide would be a 
real virtue, a kind of prior restraint on prosecutorial and law 
enforcement overzealousness and abuse.261 However, this 
indirect application would make interpretation of trial statis-
tics alone extremely problematic. 
The precise wording of the nullification instruction itself may 
determine whether the jury chooses to exercise its power.262 For 
example, nothing in the Maryland instruction allows the judge 
to marshal facts from the case to remind the jury of what 
evidence might be relevant to nullification.263 Neither does the 
Maryland instruction link the jury's power to the law charged 
in the case.264 No mention is made as to what kinds of con-
siderations should help the jury come to a just and proper 
verdict; for example, the jµry is not invited to import into its 
deliberations the conscience of the community or its own sense 
of what is just and fair. 265 In the absence of any particular 
invitation or direction, all that comes from the bench that 
would purportedly assist the jury in reaching its verdict is the 
judge's instructions on the law. Arguably, it is fair to say that 
only a very independent and intelligent jury would have the 
wherewithal to extract any practical meaning from the stan-
dard Maryland nullification instruction without additional 
clarification. 
Indeed, if not from the bench, any additional clarification 
could otherwise come only from the evidence itself or from the 
259. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 18; People v. Epps, 243 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834-35 
(N.Y. Special & Trial Term 1963). 
260. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text. 
261. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 18-19 
(1910) (claiming that (j)ury lawlessness is the "great corrective" in the administration 
of law); Scheflin, supra note 8, at 181-82 (advocating that jury discretion may be a 
useful check on prosecutorial indiscretion because "[n]o system oflaw can withstand 
the full application of its principles untempered by considerations of justice, fairness 
and mercy"). 
262. See Horowitz, supra note 236, at 29. 
263. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
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arguments of the attorneys. However, the judge has broad 
discretion to preclude evidence and arguments which the judge 
deems irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible.266 Consequently, 
a nullification instruction like the Maryland charge merely 
redefines the problem of whether to inform the jury of its 
power to nullify; it does not solve the problem. The Maryland 
instruction merely hints to the jury that it has the power to 
ignore the judge's instructions. Without further direction, 
without relevant evidence on the issue of justice, and without 
the attorney's arguments about that justice, the jury remains 
uninformed about when to use its power. Under such circum-
stances, it is no surprise that the incidence of nullification 
hardly varies from cases in which no such instruction is given. 
Without a more coherent and informative instruction, not 
only will the jury remain in the dark about its power, but they 
more likely will become confused rather than educated. 267 
Confusion may arise particularly when instructions of general 
applicability conflict with the nullification instruction. In sum, 
a standard jury instruction patterned after the Maryland model 
is neither an invitation to "anarchy"268 nor to "equity,"269 but 
rather a source of potential confusion.270 
B. The Horowitz Studies and the Effect 
of Nullification Instructions 
The effects of nullification instructions and their wording 
was the subject of mock jury studies conducted in the 1980s, 
the most well-known of which was conducted by Professor 
Irwin Horowitz.271 In his first study, Professor Horowitz divided 
forty-five, six-person juries into nine experimental groups. 
Each group listened to an audiotape of a mock trial and then 
266. See supra note 256. 
267. For a discussion on jury confusion with instructions from the bench, see 
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 110-14 (1949). The fact thatMarylandjuryverdicts 
are apparently unaffected by the instruction may be a function of its vagueness or its 
ambiguous language. 
268. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133-34 CD.C. Cir. 1972). 
269. KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 9 ("[O)ne man's equity is another man's 
anarchy."). 
270. See id. at 229-31 (discussing cases in which juries departed from the formal 
rule of law). 
271. See Horowitz, supra note 236; Horowitz, supra note 237. 
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received instructions on the law. Horowitz provided three 
different trials and three different types of instructions, such 
that no two of the nine groups saw the same trial nor heard 
the same instruction.272 
The three trials concerned euthanasia, felony murder, and 
vehicular homicide.273 The three instructions were: (1) a stan-
dard pattern instruction informing jurors that they were the 
arbiters of the facts only and that they must apply the law as 
given; (2) the Maryland nullification instruction; and (3) the 
"Radical Nullification Instruction," based on a proposal by 
Professor Jon Van Dyke.274 The Radical Nullification Instruc-
tion advised jurors of the following: 
1. Although they are a public body bound to give respect-
ful attention to the laws, they have the final authority 
to decide whether or not to apply a given law to the 
acts of the defendant on trial before them; 
2. That they represent (the community) and that it is 
appropriate to bring into their deliberations the feel-
ings of the community and their own feelings based on 
conscience; 
3. And, jurors were told that despite their respect for the 
law, nothing would bar them from acquitting the 
defendant if they feel that the law, as applied to the · 
fact situation before them, would produce an inequita-
ble or unjust result.275 
Juries that were instructed by the standard pattern jury 
instruction or the Maryland nullification instruction had 
comparable verdict patterns, with only a slight variation in 
results for the euthanasia case.276 Juries given the Radical 
Nullification Instruction, however, came out with a significant-
ly higher number of acquittals on the euthanasia case and a 
higher number of convictions on the drunk driving case. 277 
272. See Horowitz, supra note 236, at 30-32. 
273. Id. at 31. 
274. Id. at 30-31 (noting that the standard pattern instruction was taken from 
the 1974 Ohio Jury Instructions). 
275. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Van Dyke, supra note 185, at 241). 
276. Id. at 32. 
277. Id. at 32, 35. 
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Observation of the deliberations revealed that those juries 
which were instructed either by the pattern charge or by the 
Maryland nullification instruction did not seem to have any 
markedly different appreciation of their power .to nullify.278 
However, the juries that were given the Radical Nullification 
Instruction spent more time discussing the meaning of those 
instructions, less time discussing the evidence, and more time 
discussing the personal characteristics of the defendant, the 
jurors' own personal experiences relevant to the case, and 
general issues of justice.279 Apparently, juries that heard an 
explicit instruction inviting them to exercise their power to 
nullify deliberate differently than juries that are not so in-
structed. Such deliberations may also result in different 
verdicts in some cases and do not necessarily benefit the 
defendant. 280 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to infer much from these 
results because of the peculiarities of the wording in the 
Radical Nullification Instruction. First, the instruction invites 
jurors to bring in their "feelings," a wording which could convey 
to some jurors that they were thus liberated not only from the 
law and the evidence but also from reasonableness itself. The 
instruction also fails to distinguish "feelings" derived from 
conscience and those derived from the fact-finding that the jury 
is charged to do. That is, the Radical Nullification Instruction 
does not ensure that the fact-finding role of the jury remains 
unchanged. Without any other accommodation in either the 
instructions or the procedure, it would not be surprising for 
juries to fail to pay attention to the evidence and to import 
personal concerns into their fact-finding. The emphasis placed 
on "feelings" in the Radical Nullification Instruction, without 
some clearer delineation of the proper role for feelings in the 
deliberation process, is problematic and potentially confusing. 
Second, while the Radical Nullification Instruction informs 
jurors that nothing will bar them from acquitting the defen-
dant to avoid injustice, the instruction does not explicitly in-
structjurors that nullification may only benefit the defendant, 
because the standard and burden of proof on the prosecution 
does not change.281 Thus, the Radical Nullification Instruction 
278. Id. at 34. 
279. Id. at 33-36. 
280. See id. at 35. 
281. See Scheflin, supra note 8, at 214-15; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not 
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leaves open the opportunity for, and arguably invites, a nullifi-
cation conviction. Thus, this first Horowitz study might seem 
to confirm the fears of the Court in Spar{ and Hansen, that a 
jury given the widest possible latitude in finding the law may 
just as likely make the law harsher as well as make it more 
lenient.282 Consequently, the first Horowitz study, by not 
appreciating the unfortunate wording of the Radical Nullifica-
tion Instruction and not introducing any other jury control 
mechanisms, evidentiary counterweights, or nullification 
arguments from the attorneys, did not put jury nullification to 
a true test. 
Horowitz's second study introduced a number of additional 
factors into the discussion, thereby curing some but not all of 
the defects from the earlier study. The three trials played 
before the mock juries in the second study were the same 
drunk-driving, vehicular homicide case and the euthanasia case 
from the first study, as well as a new weapons possession 
case.283 In the second study, some mock juries heard the 
standard instruction without nullification language, some 
heard the Radical Nullification Instruction, and others heard 
only nullification arguments by the defense lawyers.284 Some 
juries heard prosecutorial reminders in both the opening and 
closing statements to follow the law regardless of personal 
sentiments, and those same prosecutors objected to every 
mention of nullification by the defense.285 The judge, in suc"Q 
instances, never overruled or sustained the State's objection, 
but instead instructed the jurors that they might consider 
these objections in their deliberations. 286 
The results were more complex than those from the first 
Horowitz study. First, the results demonstrated that nullifi-
cation information affected deliberations regardless of whether 
the information came from the bench by way of an instruction 
or from the defense lawyer by way of an argument. 287 Second, 
view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility 
of acquitting someone who is guilty .... In this context, I view the requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental 
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than 
to let a guilty man go free."). 
282. See Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101 (1894). 
283. Horowitz, supra note 237, at 443. 
284. Id. at 444. 
285. Id. at 444-45. 
286. Id. at 445. 
287. Id. at 446. 
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a defense attorney's nullification argument in the drunk-
driving, vehicular homicide case resulted in more confident 
guilty verdicts by the jury than if nullification was introduced 
from the bench. 288 Third, objections by the prosecutor to the 
nullification argument seemed to temper the juries' guilty 
verdicts in the vehicular homicide case.289 As in the first study, 
juries who received nullification information, whether from the 
judge or from the attorneys, spent less time deliberating the 
evidence and more time deliberating characteristics of the 
defendant, personal experiences, and general issues of jus-
tice.290 Again, the test of a nullification instruction or argument 
on deliberation was weakened in the second study by the use 
of the Radical Nullification Instruction. 
Another problem with the Horowitz studies is that they did 
not deal with the effect that a nullification instruction or 
argument could have on the general instructions given to the 
jury. To inject a nullification instruction into the judge's charge 
without making adjustments to the other charges at odds with 
it in order to clearly separate the issue of nullification from 
fact-finding serves only to confuse the jury and weaken the 
efficacy of all of the instructions. 
For example, the standard instruction that identifies the 
judge as the arbiter of the law and the jury as the arbiter of 
the facts291 is facially at odds with a nullification instruction, 
unless in the instruction there is some accommodation or 
procedural delineation of the jury's fact~finding role as separate 
from the jury's ultimate determination of guilt or innocence. 
Similarly, the standard instructions precluding a verdict based 
on bias, prejudice, sympathy, whim, speculation, or a desire to 
avoid a disagreeable duty,292 require some adjustment, either 
in the language or the procedure, so that jurors do not confuse 
a finding of reasonable doubt based on conscience with a 
finding ofreasonable doubt based on racial animus, guesswork, 
or an elevation of the standard of proof to a metaphysical 
certainty. 293 
288. Id. at 450-51. 
289. Id. at 446; see also Creagan, supra note 243, at 1140-44 (reviewing the Van 
Dyke studies). 
290. Horowitz, supra note 237, at 451-52. 
291. See, e.g., 1 CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS NEW YORK No. 2.44, at 61 (1983) 
[hereinafter CJI(NY)] ("Indictment Not Evidence"); 1 CJI(NY) No. 2.55, at 69 ("Jury 
Exclusive Judges of Facts"); 1 CJI(NY) No. 3.25, at 112 ("Function of Court and Jury"); 
1 CJI(NY) No. 5.10, at 222 ("Function of Jury"). 
292. See, e.g., 1 CJI(NY) No. 2.53, at 67 ("Potential Racial Bias"). 
293. See, e.g., 1 CJI(NY) No. 6.20, at 248-50 ("Reasonable Doubt"). 
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The standard charge perhaps most dissonant with a nullifi-
cation instruction is one that tells the jury not to consider the 
subject ofpunishment.294 Almost all nullification acquittals can 
be reduced to one common judgment-that the defendant, 
although technically guilty, should not be punished. The 
reasoning underlying this phenomenon may differ, but in any 
case, an instruction precluding jury consideration of punish-
ment is inconsistent with a nullification instruction. Again, an 
accotnmodation must be made, either by changing the language 
or by clearly delineating the jury's fact-finding role from its 
verdict obligation. Otherwise, the instruction does not empower 
the members of the jury as much as it confuses them. 
To avoid ambiguity, certain charges of general applicability 
should be linked explicitly to the nullification instruction. 
Those charges include (1) the reasonable doubt instruction, 
which establishes the standard of proof required for a convic-
tion, 295 and (2) the burden ofproofinstruction, which places the 
burden of demonstrating guilt exclusively on the prosecution.296 
A nullification instruction affects both charges in that a 
reasonable doubt could arise out of concepts of justice or 
matters of conscience not explicitly charged by the judge. 
Further, the power to nullify does not alter the prosecution's 
burden or the high standard of proof required for conviction, 
thus precluding a jury from convicting via nullification. 
V. THE PROPOSED CHARGE 
In this Part we will propose a model nullification instruction. 
We will also propose other reforms in the trial and deliberation 
process which will more closely serve the dual purposes of jury 
empowerment and rationality in r.eturning verdicts. These 
reforms include changes to pre-trial notice requirements, 
evidentiary rules, the judge's charge, and most significantly, 
a bifurcated jury deliberation process in nullification cases. 
294. See, e.g., 1 CJl(NY) No. 3.09, at 96-97 ("Jury Not to Consider Punishment"); 
1 CJl(NY) No. 6.30, at 255 ("Jury Not to Consider Punishment"). 
295. See, e.g., 1 CJl(NY) No. 6.20, at 248-50. 
296. See, e.g., 1 CJl(NY) No. 6.05, at 244 ("Burden of Proof'). 
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A. Bifurcated Deliberation 
An adequate jury nullification instruction must both em-
power the jury and provide for a rational deliberating process. 
It must liberate but not confuse. It must work alongside other 
charges of general applicability, not at cross-purposes with 
these charges. With these goals in mind, we propose a bifur-
cated jury deliberation whenever a nullification instruction is 
given in a criminal case.297 
After the attorneys' summations, the court should give the 
case to the jury with the requested final instructions, adjusted 
to accommodate the nullification charge and to eliminate 
ambiguities. At this first stage, the court should make it clear 
to the jury that this is but the first of two stages of deliberation 
and fact-finding. 
Once the jury has reached either a provisional verdict or an 
impasse,298 based solely on the applicability of the law to the 
facts, only then should the jury be charged by the court to 
consider whether or not justice demands an acquittal irre-
spective of its findings of fact. The purpose of this bifurcation 
is to avoid the adverse· consequences of a nullification in-
struction given along with other instructions by isolating the 
jury's two roles, fact-finding and verdict delivering. 
Thus, the first stage of the bifurcated deliberation should be 
similar to the usual jury deliberation in which the jury applies 
the law received from the judge to the facts. The difference will 
be that the jury will arrive at a provisional verdict, or a finding 
of fact similar to a special verdict in a civil trial. 299 Unlike a 
special verdict, however, which is impermissible in a criminal 
297. See, e.g., David U. Strawn & G. Thomas Munsterman, Helping Juries Handle 
Complex Cases, in IN THE JURY Box 180, 180-82 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman et al. eds., 
1987) (suggesting bifurcation to permit juries to handle complex cases more efficient-
ly). Whereas a nullification case is not necessarily a complex case by way of compli-
cated facts or legal theory, it is a case that invites confusion through the conflation 
of the jury's fact-finding obligation with the jury's power to render a general, 
unreviewable verdict. We believe that bifurcation provides the jury with a better 
opportunity to isolate the issue of justice in a particular case from findings of facts 
relating to the elements of the underlying crime. 
298. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 310.60 (McKinney 1993) (allowing the court 
to discharge a jury after the court determines that agreement is unlikely and each 
party consents to such a discharge, or if the court declares a mistrial under§ 280.10). 
299. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 49(a); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 4111(c) (McKinney 
1993). 
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trial, 300 the jury will not detail any explicit finding to the judge 
other than "we have reached a verdict" or "we have an im-
passe." If the ju·ry reports that it has reached a verdict, the 
court should instruct the following: 
If your vote is unanimously not guilty at this stage, then 
your deliberations are essentially over. You should return 
to the jury room to take a final vote to confirm your not 
guilty verdict. If, on the other hand, your vote is unani-
mously guilty on the facts as governed by the law as I have 
instructed you at this stage, you must return to the jury 
room for a second deliberation to determine whether, as a 
matter of conscience, these circumstances present the 
extraordinary situation where a verdict of guilty will result 
in an injustice of such magnitude that the defendant should 
be acquitted notwithstanding your provisional finding of 
guilt. 
You are the jury, and by that, you are the final authority 
to decide whether or not to apply a given law to the alleged 
acts of the defendant on trial in this case. As jurors, you 
are representatives of the community, and as such, it is 
appropriate for you to bring into your deliberations the 
community's concept of justice and your own deeply felt 
ideas about justice based on conscience. To that end, if you 
think that applying the law in the particular circumstances 
before you and convicting the defendant of some or all of 
the crimes charged would produce an inequitable or unjust 
result, then you may acquit the defendant, notwithstanding 
any findings of fact you may have already made as to the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant. Such a vote of not 
guilty is unreviewable by this or any other court. 
300. Unlike the civil rules, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide 
for a special verdict or special interrogatories. But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c) (men-
tioning special provisions permitting such findings during bench trials). 
In addition, special verdicts have been held to be error in a number of federal 
criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-81 (1st Cir. 1969); 
Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 848 (1949). 
The courts have held special verdicts impermissible in criminal cases largely because 
such an imposition from the bench infringes on the jury's right to deliberate free from 
legal fetters. See Spock, 416 F.2d at 180-83. Interrogatories interfere with the jury's 
power to arrive at a general verdict without having to support the verdict with reasons 
or a report of the jury's deliberations. Id. Most importantly, interrogatories and special 
verdicts abridge the jury's power to follow or choose not to follow the judge's charge. 
See id. at 181. 
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Again, at this second stage of deliberation, your verdict 
of not guilty must be unanimous. If only five or less of you 
vote not guilty during this second stage, then you should 
ultimately return a guilty verdict based upon your findings 
during your first stage of deliberations. However, if six or 
more of you vote not guilty at this second stage of delibera-
tions, then report to me that you are at an impasse. You 
may now return to your deliberations. 301 
The same procedure should apply when the jury has reached 
an impasse after the first stage of deliberation.302 The same 
instruction should be given for a hung jury at the second stage 
as for a jury which has unanimously found factual guilt, less 
the language reflecting that the jury is deadlocked on the facts. 
If the jury reached an impasse after the first stage and re-
mains at an impasse after the second stage, then a mistrial is 
in order ifthe parties do not consent to a discharge of the jury. 
However, if the jury has made a unanimous finding of guilt 
at the first stage, then a verdict of not guilty notwithstanding 
301. Much of the wording of our suggested instruction incorporates language from 
other proposed pattern instructions. Cf legislative bills cited supra note 245 (discuss-
ing proposals in various states to instruct the jury of its authority to consider equity 
and conscience in reaching its verdict). 
302. If the jury reports that it has reached an impasse at the first stage, i.e., that 
it is unable to agree on a finding of factual guilt or non-guilt, the judge should then 
instruct the following: 
You have indicated to me that you cannot reach a unanimous decision as to the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant on the facts as governed by the law as I have 
instructed you. Accordingly, I direct that you return to the jury room for a 
second deliberation to determine whether as a matter of conscience, these 
circumstances present the extraordinary situation where a verdict of not guilty 
will result in a better administration of justice despite the fact that some of you 
believe that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime 
charged. 
You are the jury, and by that, you are the final authority to decide whether 
or not to apply a given law to the alleged acts of the defendant on trial in this 
case. As jurors, you are representatives of the community, and as such, it is 
appropriate for you to bring into your deliberations the community's concept of 
. justice and your own deeply felt ideas about justice based on conscience. To that 
end, if you think that applying the law in the particular circumstances before 
you and convicting the defendant of some or all of the crimes charged would 
produce an inequitable or unjust result, then you may vote to acquit the 
defendant, notwithstanding any findings offact you may have already made as 
to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Such a vote of not guilty is unre-
viewable by this or any other court. 
Again, at this second stage of deliberation, your verdict of not guilty must be 
unanimous. If it is not unanimous, then you must report to me that you are at 
an impasse again. You may now return to your deliberations. 
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factual guilt at the second stage must also be unanimous, and 
a minority vote of not guilty at the second stage should be 
insufficient to hang the jury. In other words, if a unanimous 
jury makes a factual finding of guilt at the first stage, a guilty 
verdict will stand unless, notwithstanding factual guilt, at least 
six jurors in a twelve-person jury vote not guilty at the second 
stage.303 If six or more jurors vote to nullify but the jury falls 
short of unanimous agreement, then an impasse and a mistrial 
should be declared. A unanimous vote of not-guilty notwith-
standing factual guilt is the only vote sufficient to permit a 
verdict of not-guilty once the second stage has been reached. 
To avoid the criticisms of a special verdict in criminal trials,304 
none of these deliberations should be reported to the judge. No 
doubt, such a procedure at the second stage places additional 
burdens on the jury foreperson in charge of the deliberation 
process, but this procedure is no more difficult or cumbersome 
than any number of instructions and procedures that juries 
now are expected to follow. 305 
The purpose behind requiring a non-minority vote of ac-
quittal at the second stage in order to hang a jury that had 
unanimously found factual guilt is to emphasize the impor-
tance of the first stage deliberations and the resultant findings. 
A decision to nullify a previous finding of guilt according to law 
should not be viewed casually. Whereas the first stage requires 
unanimity as a jury control protection against an improper 
verdict based on improper fact-finding,306 the second stage 
requires a balancing of interests not under explicit consider-
ation during the first stage. At the second stage, the jury has 
been expressly instructed that it is empowered to acquit in 
spite of the law as charged by the judge and irrespective of the 
law as it pertains to the facts found during the first stage of 
deliberations. With evidence of guilt established at the first 
stage, it is proper to require something more than a single vote 
303. The formula for declaring impasse or referring back to the original finding 
of factual guilt is based on a 12-person jury model. Not all states try crimes with a 
12-personjury. Thus, with a 6-personjury, the number of votes required to constitute 
an impasse at the second stage should be half that required to hang a 12-personjury, 
or 3-not-guilty votes. 
304. See supra note 300. 
305. See, e.g., Strawn & Munsterman, supra note 297, at 180-83 (suggesting an 
instruction to the jury to deliberate issues in a complex case sequentially). 
306. See David A. Vollrath & James H. Davis, Jury Size and Decision Rule, in THE 
JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 73-106 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1980) (discussing 
unanimity and non-unanimity requirements in jury trials). 
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for nullification by a single juror to create an impasse at the 
second stage.307 The purposes of a jury nullification instruction 
must be to empower the jury and to provide rational process. 
Once a jury has made a unanimous finding of fact according 
to law, rational process requires that the power of a jury to 
disaffirm that finding must be itself the product of some 
measure of consensus, not merely the caprice of one person or 
a small number of people. 
B. The Notice Requirement and Evidentiary Parameters 
Bifurcation of the deliberation process is the primary means 
by which rational process would be achieved in our proposed 
system. However, it is not and cannot be the only means. For 
example, the prosecutor's objections and arguments against 
nullification strongly influence the jury.308 This is as it should 
be. Rational process and full deliberation require not only that 
the nullification power be made explicit but also that the con-
trary position be explored fully as well. The only way to make 
sure that the jury's verdict is the product of deeply felt ideas 
about justice is to put those ideas to the test of controversy. In 
this regard, a defendant's request for a nullification charge 
necessarily opens the door to a nullification case itself.309 
Thus, as a matter of procedure, the prosecution must be giv-
en adequate opportunity to try its counternullification case. A 
sufficient opportunity requires pre-trial notice, much like a 
notice of an alibi310 or a non-responsibility defense.311 Notice 
would not only inform the prosecution of the defense's intention 
to request a nullification charge but also provide a brief 
307. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 377 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(discussing juror "irrationality" and decision rules). 
308. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
309. The concept of "opening the door" to what ordinarily would be inadmissible 
evidence is a familiar concept to criminal trial lawyers. For instance, Rule 405 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence permits the admission of testimony relating to character 
traits and reputation evidence. The scope of cross-examination, however, expands com-
mensurately into inquiry of specific instances of conduct that might shed a contrary 
light on character. In other words, when the defense puts its good character at issue, 
the defense opens the door to bad character evidence. 
310. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 250.20 (McKinney 1993). 
311. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 250.10 (McKinney 1993). 
924 University of Michigan Journal, of Law 'Refonn [VOL. 28:4 
description of the content of the defense itself.312 For example, 
if such a procedural requirement had been in place during the 
Leroy Reed gun possession case,313 the defense attorney would 
have given notice of the defendant's diminished intelligence 
and illiteracy, his lack of blameworthiness in purchasing the 
gun, and his ignorance both the law and of the requirements 
of his parole to the prosecution before trial in order to afford 
the prosecution the opportunity to investigate and prepare its 
case. 
The notice requirement should not be construed as burden-
shifting to the disadvantage of the defendant. If the defendant 
wishes to try a nullification defense without putting the 
prosecution on notice, it could do so in the form of argument. 
The only problem the defense will encounter is that the court 
will not provide a nullification instruction, and the judge may 
rule more strictly on legal relevancy, thus precluding some of 
the defendant's evidence. On the other hand, adherence to the 
notice requirement will not lock the defendant into a nullifica-
tion defense. If the defendant chooses at the last minute to 
assert a more standard defense and does not open the door to 
nullification issues before the jury, then the scope of the 
prosecution's case remains the same as it would be otherwise. 
The scope of the prosecution's case expands only when the 
defense opens the door to counternullification by putting forth 
facts and arguments clearly aimed at creating a defense beyond 
the bounds of positive law. This result requires some care on 
the part of the defense, because mere mention of the nullifica-
tion argument, even during voir dire questioning, may serve 
to open the door. 
Finally, bifurcation will not place additional burdens upon 
the defense. Defense attorneys are accustomed to cautious 
toeing of the evidentiary line in order to avoid raising certain 
issues. For example, they must raise character and propensity 
issues cautiously because of the risk that they will open the 
door to the admission of prior bad acts or negative personal 
traits. 314 Defense counsel take similar care to avoid questioning 
police conduct when it might open the door to otherwise 
312. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 250.20 (requiring the defendant to provide a list 
of the places where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the crime and 
a list of witnesses to corroborate the alibi). 
313. See supra Part II.A. 
314. See FED. R. Evm. 404(a)(l). 
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inadmissible and prejudicial evidence that would rehabilitate 
the police witness or explain the officer's conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
A nullification instruction and a bifurcated deliberation that 
separate fact-finding from the issues of conscience which might 
prevail notwithstanding factual guilt, along with the pre-trial 
procedural and evidentiary adjustments discussed, will serve 
the dual requirements needed for informed nullification. Such 
an instruction must communicate in a relatively simple and 
straightforward manner the power that the jury has to acquit 
in spite of a clear violation of criminal law. The instruction and 
the related procedures must also create a process by which that 
power will be exercised thoughtfully-through a process that 
encourages true deliberation rather than confusion, caprice, or 
bad faith. 
Implementation of such procedures will not necessarily make 
trial procedure more efficient. It probably will not diminish the 
length of most trials and may even lengthen others. It will do 
very little for clogged court calendars and overcrowded jails. 
But it will enhance integrity in the jury's work. Instead of 
nullifying the judge's instructions by focusing on surrogate 
issues, such as lack of mens rea, or raising the standard of 
proof, the jury will be given the opportunity to consider directly 
the issue of justice. Direct consideration will in turn produce 
verdicts that better satisfy the jury and society, not because · 
the results will be any different than they would be otherwise, 
but because they will be verdicts deriving from informed 
discussion. The jury will understand its power and have a 
procedural structure that will encourage it to use that power 
rationally, carefully, and deliberately. · 
The recent examples of jury nullification add little to the 
history of jury verdicts nor signal fundamental changes in the 
character of the American jury. What has changed, through 
media focus, is the degree to which the public experiences the 
nullification phenomenon. More importantly, the political 
conclusions that interpretations of recent verdicts have 
spawned are based upon information that is neither complete 
nor informed. 
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A carefully crafted nullification instruction and deliberation 
procedure will help accomplish a number of salutary purposes, 
including increasing the availability of information on how 
juries deliberate. It will also rationalize jury decision making 
by allowing the jury to discuss issues of justice and mercy 
without forcing them to deliberate these issues covertly 
through the use of surrogates disguised as fact-finding. To that 
end, this Article advocates a bifurcated deliberation procedure 
that clearly separates the fact-finding task from the justice-
dispensing function of the jury, both for the jury's sake and for 
the sake of a society that desires rational process in its courts. 
Moreover, a pattern nullification instruction and deliberation 
procedure will further empower communities, particularly 
those which are poor and disenfranchised, to exercise direct 
and immediate oversight over government action. In that way, 
it will strengthen the respect for the jury process and the 
criminal justice system in communities that are currently 
estranged from their government by giving societal recognition 
to the right of ordinary citizens to exercise discretion on law 
enforcement. 
Finally, although defendants will be free to pursue a nulli-
fication defense without an instruction, this Article proposes 
that, in order to receive a nullification instruction, defendants 
must give notice to the ·prosecution to prepare a counter 
nullification case, to address issues of relevancy during the 
trial, and to impose a cost upon the defendant electing to 
pursue such an extraordinary defense and jury instruction. 
In the final analysis, we need juries to deliberate honestly 
and openly, not just because society learns from their decisions, 
but also because juries in essence are the last deliberative body 
of grassroots decision making.· As Professor Abramson writes, 
"only the jury still regularly calls upon ordinary citizens to 
engage each other in a face-to-face process of debate."315 
We vote alone and in secret. Our elected officials do not 
always engage in principled discussion about issues, sometimes 
preferring to talk in sound-bites and to jostle each other for 
large contributions to their war chests. The judiciary is re-
moved from our direct influence by design. Ordinary citizens, 
particularly those who are poor and without political power, 
are increasingly alienated from the process of government and 
feel increasingly forgotten by it. In the absence of the early 
315. ABRAMSON, supra note 112, at 8. 
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colonial town meetings where citizens were able to participate 
directly in government, the jury remains the only institution 
through which ordinary citizens know that their voices and 
votes still count. Indeed, "the jury is the last, best refuge of 
this connection among democracy, deliberation, and the 
achievement of wisdom by ordinary persons."316 Consequently, 
rationalizing the jury deliberation process helps to restore our 
sense that, in some arena of governance, purposeful self-
del usion need no longer be the norm. 
POSTSCRIPT 
At the time that this Article was completed, the trial of O.J. 
Simpson317 was still in progress. We did not discuss the case 
because any speculation as to whether jury nullification might 
have been at play would clearly have been premature. Now 
that the jury has returned a unanimous verdict of acquittal, 
some perceive the Simpson verdict as illustrative of jury 
nullification.318 Although it is impossible to make confident 
conclusions from post-trial juror statements, we believe that 
the wide extent of the speculation about it is illustrative of the 
confusion now surrounding the meaning of jury verdicts and 
the issue of jury nullification. Whereas there was extensive 
speculation of nullification in the Simpson case, despite the 
ample evidence to indicate that the jury did not nullify, nullifi-
cation was relatively undiscussed in cases involving "abuse 
excuse" defenses, where nullification could have been, in fact, 
at work.319 
While we offer no comprehensive analysis of the Simpson 
verdict we note several striking aspects about it. There is much 
basis to believe that juror doubts were not grounded in 
Simpson's celebrity status or race so much as in mistrust of the 
316. Id. at 11. 
317. People v. Simpson, No. B3BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995). 
318. See, e.g., Laura Mansnerus, Under Fire, Jury System Faces Overhaul, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995, at L9 (quoting Greg Totten, the executive director of the 
California District Attorneys Association as stating "Simpson does illustrate vividly 
the problem of jury nullification"). 
319. See supra Part II. 
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prosecution's evidence,320 the credibility of the prosecution's 
witnesses,321 and the prosecution's theory of the case.322 Indeed, 
particularly telling was one juror's post-verdict, gnawing 
suspicion of Simpson's guilt. In that regard, she stated, "[I]fwe 
made a mistake, I would rather it be a mistake on the side of 
a person's innocence than the other way."323 When she had ex-
pressed her doubt to several other jurors, she reported that 
they cried and remarked that" '[m]aybe the laws need to be 
changed to remove the reasonable doubt.' "324 These anecdotes 
indicate a jury taking seriously the presumption of innocence, 
the standard of proof, andthe policy that undergirds both due 
process protections-that we as a society would rather occa-
sionally acquit the guilty to ensure that we have a system that 
does not convict the innocent. 
In addition, the Simpson jury seemed to have been listening 
to the judge's instructions of general applicability rather than 
disregarding them. One of the instructions charged: 
[A] witness who is willfully false in one material part of his 
or her testimony is to be distrusted in others. You may 
reject the whole testimony of a witness who has willfully 
testified falsely as to a material point unless from all the 
320. Brenda Moran, the first juror to make a public statement, indicated doubts 
about whether the bloody glove fit on Simpson, Larry King Live, Transcript #1556 
(CNN television Broadcast, Oct. 4, 1995) (transcript at 8, on file with the University 
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), and possible crime lab blood preservative on 
evidence supposedly found at the crime scene, Larry King Live, Transcript 1558 (CNN 
television broadcast, Oct. 6, 1995) (transcript at 6, on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Anice Aschenbach, a white juror who initially voted 
for guilt in the first jury poll, also thought the DNA evidence was "shaky." Prime Time 
Live, Transcript #422 (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 4, 1994) (transcript at 1, on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
321. Aschenbach stated that it was "possible that the [bloody glove) was planted" 
by Detective Fuhrman at Simpson's estate. She expressed that she largely discounted 
Fuhrman's testimony because of the detective's virulent racism and previous perjury, 
as well as doubted the credibility of the lead detective in the Simpson investigation. 
Prime Time Live, Transcript #422, supra note 320 (transcript at 1). 
322. Alternate juror Walter Watson Calhoun stated his doubts about the time line 
presented by the prosecution. He stated that to him "the key moment was the time 
element of-that they allotted Mr. Simpson to change his clothes, get rid of a weapon, 
clean himself up, and all those things a murderer would have to do, it was impossible 
for him to do it in five minutes." Larry King Live, Transcript #1556, supra note 320 
(transcript at 9). 
323. Prime Time Live, Transcript #422, supra note 320 (transcript at 2). 
324. Id. 
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evidence you believe the probability of truth favors his or 
her testimony in other particulars . . . . 325 
Such a strong instruction as to witness credibility, combined 
with the strong emphasis by both sides on the police witness' 
credibility, or lack of it, was apparently devastating to the 
prosecution. While the underlying tensions between the Los 
Angeles African American community and the Los Angeles 
Police Department may have been at work with regard to how 
the police testimony was received by the Simpson jury, the 
judge's instruction, in effect, invited them to disregard all the 
testimony of the police witnesses. Thus, no importation of 
general and extralegal antipolice sentiment was necessary for 
the jury to discount the police testimony. Indeed, the evidence 
suggests that the Simpson jury listened to Judge Ito very 
carefully. 
325. 0.J. Unofficial Transcript 10:19 a.m.-11:33 a.m. (Pacific), Sept. 22, 1995, 
available in Westlaw, OJ-Update Database. 

